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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Arab Boycott
of Israel from an economic and a political perspective. This
study covers the Arab boycott from 1946 until 1990. It
demonstrates that economically and politically, the Arab
boycott had three distinct phases. The first of these was the
period from the declaration of the Arab boycott in 1946 until
the 1973 War. The second phase took place between the 1973
War and the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.
The third phase began with the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace
agreement and ends in 1990. This study suggests that the
boycott was most effective when supported by the threat of an
oil embargo in effect between 1973 and 1979. U.S. actions
against the Arab boycott were also effective. Finally, this
thesis contends that the 1979 peace agreement between Israel
and Egypt brought frustration to those who expected that
Israel's trade with such a close and large country as Egypt
would open a huge trade market. In sum, the Arab boycott did
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I . INTRODUCTION
The Arab boycott of Israel, which began two years before
Israel achieved independence, has now been in effect for 46
years. The first formal declaration of the boycott stated
that "Jewish products and manufactured goods shall be
considered undesirable to the Arab countries" . [Ref . 1]
As the years passed, the boycott was expanded in an attempt to
prevent any trade between Arab countries and international
companies that traded with Israel
.
Since 1946, several important factors in Middle East
politics and economics have had an impact on the boycott.
This thesis analyzes these major events and their effect on
the boycott of Israel. Arab oil, which was the major Arab
export to the Western countries and Japan, is a significant
factor in determining the impact of the Arab boycott. The
role of the U.S., which makes up a major part of the trade
with the Arab countries and with Israel, is also significant
in determining the impact of the Arab boycott.
The thesis examines the boycott from a chronological
perspective. It analyzes changes in the direction of the Arab
boycott through its 46 years of existence. The thesis is
divided into four chapters showing the main regional political
events that developed in the Middle East . Except for the
first chapter, all chapters are built in a structure which
examines the Arab boycott's effectiveness from three
perspectives and conclusions. The first perspective is an
economic perspective, the second is political, and the third
perspective is an examination of the U.S. response to the
boycott
.
The first chapter presents an introduction to the Arab
boycott. The second chapter deals with the Arab boycott from
the time it was declared until the 1973 war. The third
chapter examines the effectiveness of the Arab boycott under
the significant impact of the oil embargo, during the years
1973 - 1979. The fourth chapter examines the effectiveness of
the boycott during the era of the Peace agreement between
Israel and Egypt, 1979 - 1990. The thesis also includes




This research will attempt to evaluate the effectiveness
of the Arab boycott of Israel during the years 1946 - 1990.
Subsidiary questions that will be addressed in the thesis are
as follows:
1. What is the Arab boycott? What are the objectives which
the boycott was intended to achieve? How does it work in
theory and in practice?
2
.
How much economic influence has the Arab boycott had on
Israel since it began in 1946 and how did the Israeli
government respond?
3. What major political and economic events have influenced
the boycott and what is the nature of this influence?
4. What was the position of the United States on the boycott
from 1946 until 1990?
5. What was the position of the Japanese government on the
boycott?
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The scope of this thesis will essentially be to evaluate
the impact of the Arab boycott on Israel. It will analyze how
and why the Arab boycott changed from a direct boycott on
trade with Israel to an indirect boycott that included
international companies which traded with Israel. It will
analyze the effect of the Arab boycott in both economic and
political terms. This thesis will examine the American
response to the boycott, in terms of both government policy
and corporate practice. It will also identify the response of
Japanese companies to the boycott.
C . METHODOLOGY
Research data were collected through various methods.
First, the author researched about 300 articles from
newspapers and magazines throughout the applicable years, that
dealt with the boycott from the Arab perspective and from the
U.S. and Israeli perspectives. Second, the author researched
economic and trade data, regulations and books that dealt with
this topic.
In general, Israel's trade relations with other countries
have been increasing from the date of its independence, in
1948. Had this thesis tried to analyze the impact of the Arab
boycott on Israel from Israel's economic perspective only, a
mistaken conclusion could have been reached. Many Israeli
economic factors like inflation, currency rates, etc., have
affected Israeli economic and trade policies during the period
of the Arab boycott. An attempt to specify and deal with each
factor separately would be difficult without moving into
speculation. As a result, this thesis does not analyze these
factors separately. In order to assess the effectiveness of
the Arab boycott, this thesis focuses on Israel's trade and
compares it to Arab countries' trade.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT
The Arab countries have been boycotting Israel and the
Jews for many decades. Although the Arab countries had
economic sanctions against the Jews for many years, this
thesis will begin with the establishment of the Arab League in
1945, when the first organized action was taken by the Arab
countries and two years before the independence of Israel.
[Ref. 2]
The first chapter will give an overview of the main
players and their actions which created the Arab boycott of
Israel. The main purpose of this chapter is to give the
reader tools to understand common terms that will be used in
the next chapters
.
A. THE ARAB LEAGUE
The Arab League was established in 1945 by seven Arab
countries: Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia
and Iraq. The Palestinian Arabs who did not have a state were
given a full vote as well. By 1973 the Arab League had 20
independent member states and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) . [Ref. 3]
The Arab League executive branch is called the Arab League
Council . It is made up of heads of the Arab League countries
and their delegated representatives.
B. THE PRIMARY BOYCOTT
The Arab boycott of Israel began in December 1945 after
this declaration of the Council of the Arab League: " . . .
Effective Jan. 1, 1946, Jewish products and manufactured
goods shall be considered undesirable in the Arab
countries..." [Ref. 4] The primary Arab boycott
principally affects imports from Israel to Arab countries.
The declaration opened the door for the first organized
boycott and the longest one - extending to the present time.
In simple terms, the boycott was an attempt to economically
isolate Israel from its neighbors.
The Council of the Arab League decided on three directions
to attack Israel's independence, which was achieved in 194 8.
First would be in the field of diplomacy. The second would be
war, and the third would be the boycott. By 1949, the Central
Boycott Office (CBO) moved from Cairo to Damascus in order to
transform declarations and theories to practice.
[Ref. 5]
The Arab League which has given specific legal sanction to
the anti- Israel boycott by approving a "Unified Law on the
Boycott of Israel," the provisions of which have been
subsequently incorporated into the domestic legislation of
each member state. [Ref. 6] The Primary Boycott,
which is the "Unified Law, " prohibits all Arab persons from
making any trade with any persons or firms resident in Israel,
or of Israeli nationality, or acting on behalf or in the
interests of Israel regardless of the commercial or financial
nature of the dealing. [Ref. 7]
C. THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT (1948)
The secondary boycott prohibited trade with third country
companies and individuals that maintained any type of
commercial relations with Israel. These are companies and
individuals that come from countries other than Israel and the
Arab League states. The notion underlying these secondary
boycott actions supposedly is that the boycott will be applied
solely against those business firms contributing to the
economy and war effort of Israel, or expressed another way,
against any firm which is found to be violating any of the
prohibited practices specified in the boycott regulations.
For example, transactions are banned by Arab League members
with any manufacturing or trading firm which: has main or
branch factories or assembly plants in Israel; has main
offices for Middle East operations in Israel; holds shares in
Israeli companies or factories; or provides consultative
services or technological experience to these factories.
[Ref. 8]
D. EXTENDED SECONDARY BOYCOTT - (TERTIARY BOYCOTT)
In practice, the Extended Secondary Boycott prohibits
trade with any company in which one of its product parts comes
from another company that was blacklisted. [Ref. 9]
The tertiary form of boycotting holds that purchases by Arab
countries should be eliminated on products and services of
those firms which are not in themselves supporters of Israel,
but which continue to trade with other companies that have
been blacklisted. In other words, the tertiary boycott would
require a neutral person or firm A not to have commercial
dealings with another person or firm B because B in some
perceived way had supported Israel. Ostensibly
,
the tertiary
boycott aims to achieve near total effectiveness of the
secondary boycott by preventing even indirect transactions
with blacklisted firms, or with Israel. This boycott was
established in April 1950. [Ref . 10]
E. BLACKLIST
From the perspective of foreign corporate entities and
individuals, at the heart of the Arab secondary boycott of
Israel lies its formal blacklist. [Ref. 11] From the
Central Boycott Office (CBO) point of view, any company in the
world that does not maintain the declarations of the CBO and
makes direct or indirect trade with Israel could not trade
with any Arab country. The name of this firm would be printed
in a "Blacklist" which was distributed among the Arab
countries. [Ref. 12]
F. HOW THE ARAB BOYCOTT WORKS
1. Structure
According to the Arab boycott's decision making, there
are four main organizational make ups : The Central Boycott
Office (CBO) , The Regional Boycott Office, The Units of
Communication Officers, and The General Conference of the Arab
Boycott of Israel. The responsibility of each of them is
described below.
a. The Central Boycott Office
The CBO, residing in Damascus, has the primary
responsibility for converting decisions made by the General
Conference to actions. Throughout the year, information is
gathered, analyses are prepared and recommendations are given.
The CBO is made up of 18 departments which are responsible to
geographic regions all over the world, and it includes
departments for development and research. The CBO has 2 00
staff members to assist the countries' representatives.
[Ref. 13]
b. The Regional Boycott Offices
Since May, 1949 each Arab country has had a
national office for the CBO which is called the 'regional
unit' or 'the regional boycott office'. [Ref. 14]
These units communicate between the domestic government and
the CBO. If the domestic government wants to initiate an
idea, its representative must speak with the regional unit and
not with the CBO directly. In this way the domestic
government will receive the decision from the General
Conference. However, each individual country can elect to
follow or ignore the CBO decision.
Each Arab League State has its own boycott law.
There is considerable variance among Arab states in the text
of laws and regulations. [Ref. 15]
c. The Communication Officers
Communication Officers are placed in all the
countries of the world which have diplomatic relations with an
Arab country. In spite of their position in the embassy, they
are acting under orders of the CBO. Their job is to look for
companies that trade, directly or indirectly, with Israel.
[Ref. 16]
d. The General Conference
The members of The General Conference are the
representatives of each Arab League country and the CBO.
Twice a year, before the Arab League Conference, the General
Conference meets and makes decisions to present to the Arab
League Conference. The General Conference considers
recommendations from the CBO and sets priority objectives for
the boycott. The General Conference alternates its meeting
place among numerous Arab cities. [Ref. 17]
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2. How the Blacklist System Works
The staff of the CBO gathers information from many-
sources including trade publications, Arab and non Arab
businessmen, Regional Offices, Communication Of ficers, Israeli
press and publications. Second, the CBO analyzes the
information and takes one of two actions. The CBO either
recommends an immediate blacklisting (this action is rare) or
the CBO will inform the firm of the "offense" against boycott
principles and request that the firm complete a questionnaire
designed to verify the information. Reply must be in Arabic
and certified by an Arab diplomatic mission. Also, 24 copies
must be provided, one for each of the League member states and
for the League's executives. Failure to respond in this
manner frequently results in blacklisting. [Ref. 18]
If criteria for blacklisting have been met, the CBO
will present its proposal to blacklist this firm in the
General Conference semi-annual meeting. The General
Conference considers each proposal and adds or deletes each
violator from the official CBO blacklist. Real action will be
taken by each Arab state after its representative and its
Regional Boycott Office publish the decision in their official
gazettes. [Ref. 19]
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III. THE ARAB BOYCOTT FROM 1946 UNTIL THE 1973 WAR
This chapter will overview the characteristics of the Arab
boycott since it was established by the Arab League in 1945
until the 1973 (Yom Kippur) War, which was a major point of
change
.
The chapter will present several examples of the Arab
boycott working during this era. Second, statistical data on
blacklisting work will be presented. The author will analyze
economic and political data and their impact on Israel.
Third, the U.S. response to the boycott will be analyzed.
Finally, the chapter will end with conclusions.
In this era, the Arab boycott began to transition from
declarations to actions. The CBO began to gather data and
took action (blacklisting) against more than 2000 companies
and organizations as will be described later in this chapter.
In addition to the working of the CBO as the combined arm of
all the Arab states, some of the Arab countries took actions
against Israel individually.
The most extreme decision of an Arab country after the
declaration of the Boycott was Egypt's decision on May, 15,
1948 to close the Suez Canal. The Canal was blocked for ships
which had cargo going to or from Israel. Ships proceeding
southward through the Suez Canal were required to submit their
log books. If found to have called at any Israeli port, ships
12
were placed on a blacklist and were no longer allowed access
to Egyptian waters. Included among those ships that were
blacklisted were the following: [Ref. 20]
• The Italian ship Franca Maria whose cargo of meat and
hides destined for Haifa was forfeited on December 16,
1953.
• The British freighter Socotra, whose shipment of horsehair
to Israel was appropriated on April 1, 1961.
In addition to restricting use of the Canal, Egypt built
military bases on the islands of Tiran and Sanafir in 1950 to
cut off the ability of ships to dock at the Israeli Red Sea
Port of Eilat. In December, 1953, the U.S. vessel Albion was
fired upon while transporting wheat to Jordan. Israel was
forced to develop other trade routes and its own merchant
fleet. These cases were some of the major contributing causes
of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt. [Ref. 21]
The victory of Israel in the 1956 War made the lifting of
the blockade on Eilat Port in the Red sea a condition for
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. (Egypt decided
during the war to sink 12 ships in the Suez Canal just in case
Israel would remain near the Canal. The Suez Canal remained
closed until 1957.) [Ref. 22]
After the declaration of independence of Israel in 1948,
the CBO and the Arab League decided on the Secondary Boycott.
This boycott came to be another obstacle for the young Jewish
country in trying to develop organized trade with foreign
countries. This boycott, as described in the first chapter,
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was the first indirect boycott. It was an attempt to leave
Israel isolated not only from its neighbors but also from all
remote countries. After 1950 this Secondary Boycott was
expanded to the Extended Secondary Boycott or Tertiary Boycott
(described in Chapter II)
.
While the Arab blockade continued, Israel had the ability
for external trade only through the Haifa Port by the sea and
also the air route since trade by land was totally blockaded
by Arab countries. The air route was also threatened by the
Arab countries when, in 1950, the CBO prohibited all aircraft
intending to go to Israel from flying over Arab territory.
That prohibition continues even today (except for Egypt)
although it violates the rules of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) . An attempt by the Arab League
to tighten the air blockade by threatening to ban any
international airline which continued to fly to Israel was
defeated by the ICAO. The ICAO told the Arab countries that
if the current free access by air to Israel was hindered, all
airlines would stop all flights to the Arab countries as well.
[Ref. 23]
A. THE BOYCOTT OF COCA-COLA
An example of partial success of the Arab boycott was the
boycott of Coca-Cola. In April, 1966, Coca-Cola refused to
permit establishment of a plant in Israel. Although Coca-Cola
at that time owned plants in other small countries (like
14
Cyprus, an island with a population of 250,000 citizens, 150
miles from Israel), Coca-Cola determined that Israel, with
2,000,000 citizens, was not ready for this plant. However,
the real reason was because of the risk of losing 29 plants in
the Arab countries, with 5000 employees. [Ref. 24]
As the issue received increased media attention, American
Jews began a consumer boycott of Coca-Cola. New York City's
Committee on Human Rights announced it would question Coca-
Cola officials on their policies. In just eight days Coca-
Cola reversed its decision and decided to approve the
investment in a new plant in Israel. [Ref. 25]
In reaction, the CBO gave Coca-Cola three months to freeze
its contract in Israel. By November, 1966, Coca-Cola was
officially blacklisted but the implementation of this decision
was conducted by each of the Arab governments themselves . The
Arab countries took another two years to try to convince Coca-
Cola to close its plant in Israel. By 1968 (after the 1967
War), its plants were closed in most of the Arab countries.
This situation existed until the peace agreement between
Israel and Egypt in 1979. [Ref. 26]
From Table I we can see that by 1968, the Arab boycott
named 60 countries that had companies in the blacklist. Table
II indicates that there were 2,462 companies on the blacklist.
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Table I. . COUNTRIES WITH COMPANIES APPEARING ON ARAB BOYCOTT


















Source: Sharrif, Statistical Study of Arab Boycott,
Beirut, 1970.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA ON FIRMS AND SHIPS BOYCOTTED
The total number of firms subject to the Arab boycott by
the year 1968 was 2686. Also, 224 firms have been deleted
from the blacklist. A total of 2462 firms were blacklisted by
the year 1968. [Ref. 27]
From Table II we can see that the Commerce sector of all
sectors of businesses leads with 520 firms blacklisted or 21.1
percent of the total net boycotted. The commerce sector was
followed by Conglomerates with 379 firms or 15.4 percent, and
Engineering and Electronics with 355 firms or 14.5 percent of
the net total firms boycotted.
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Table II. ESTABLISHMENT BY SECTOR & SHIP: NUMBER OF FIRMS
BOYCOTTED AND NUMBER OF FIRMS DELETED FROM BOYCOTT LIST 1954-
1968
SECTORS Firms Firms Net Per-







Chemicals & Pharmaceutical 174 16 158 6.4
Commerce 552 32 520 21.1
Conglomerates 435 56 379 15.4
Engineering & Electronics 401 46 355 14 .5
Finance 207 6 201 8.2
Food & Store 313 5 308 12.5
Housing & construction 90 16 74 3.0
Miscellaneous 335 38 297 12.0
Shipping Agents 98 4 94 3.8
Textile Trade & Industry 81 5 76 3.1
TOTAL 2686 224 2462 100.0
Ships 772 260 512
Source Sharrif , Statistical Study of Arab Boycott, Institute
of Palestine, Beirut, 1970.
Research by Sharrif also shows that the number of firms
boycotted by year indicates that the highest figures were
concentrated during the years 1964-1967 with a total of 823
firms representing 63 percent of the net total on the
blacklist. The years with the lowest number of firms
boycotted (from 1957 till 1961) totalled 89 firms, only 3
percent of the net total on the blacklist. [Ref. 28]
A total of 512 ships had been boycotted. The boycott list
included 32 countries, but eight countries had 74 percent of
the total. Greece had 26 percent of the total. tJK, with 13
percent and the U.S. with 11 percent were the others leading
17
the list. Japan was the only major shipping industrial
country which did not appear on the blacklist.
[Ref. 29]
C. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
On the other side of the boycott during the years 1946 -
1973 was the state of Israel, trying to deal with the
situation. In order to analyze the Arab boycott's
effectiveness, this thesis describes major aspects in Israel
which directly or indirectly dealt with the Arab boycott.
First the reader must understand that many factors have
influenced Israel's political and economic situation and it is
difficult to isolate the influence of the Arab boycott. For
example, one should consider that one of the aspects of
international trade is inflation, and another one is trade
rate. At the beginning of the boycott, Israel had just
gotten its independence (in 1948) . This boycott was just one
of many problems for the new country. The day after
independence, Israel was attacked by all the Arab countries
which surrounded it. During the period 1948 - 1973, Israel
was involved in four major wars with Arab countries - (194 8,
1956, 1967, and 1973) . Second, after World War II hundreds of
thousands of Jewish immigrants came to Israel. Third, Israel
was a new country with little experience in foreign and
domestic matters.
18
At this time Israel had three main resources to import
money: The first was development bonds sold to American Jews.
In 1964, $98.7 million were sold. Second was German
restitution payments after World War II (in 1964, $134.2
million) and third was loans. Israel did not receive much
economic aid from the U.S.- about eight million dollars in
1964. [Ref. 30]
After the 19 67 war, France, which had given a big supply
of military aid to Israel, decided to implement a military
embargo on the Middle East. From that time Israel began to
develop an expanded military trade with the U.S.
The data which are provided in Tables III, IV, and V
indicate continuing growth in imports and exports. It can be
seen that the significant growth in the population from
1,370,100 in 1950 to 3,022,000 residents in 1970 (especially
because Jews were immigrating to Israel) caused a radical
increase in GNP. The GNP rose about five percent per year
until 1960 and then between two and three percent until the
1970's.
From Table IV it can seen that Israel's imports were
increasing steadily by 60 percent from 1950 to 1960 ($300
million in 1950 to $495 million in 1960) . However, in the
next ten years, imports tripled from $495 million to $1,433
million by 1970.
From Table V it is evident that Israeli exports increased
from $35 million in 1950 to $211 million in 1960 (500
19




































Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981, no. 32,
Jerusalem.
Note 1: Includes Jews and Non-Jews for 1970 in the
administrated territories, since Israeli
residents after the 1967 war include
residents of the new occupied territories.
Note 2 : Average annual percent change within decades
shown in parentheses.
Note 3: At 1975 prices.
Note 4: In millions of Israel Shekels.
percent). By 1970, exports grew to $733.6 million (247
percent)
.
To summarize these tables, in spite of the Arab boycott
and because of many factors not addressed in this thesis
(e.g., inflation, trade rate), Israel's economy in general
grew dramatically during the years 1950 - 1970.
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Table IV. ISRAELI IMPORTS 1959 1970
(in millions of U.S. Dollars)
FOREIGN TRADE 1950 1960 1970
Net Import of








Inputs 169.1 353.5 972.4
Investment
Goods 56.2 105.0 347.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982, no. 32,
Jerusalem.
Table V. ISRAELI EXPORTS 1950 1970
(in millions of U.S. Dollars)
FOREIGN TRADE 1950 1960 1970
Net Export of










Exports 9.4 92.6 393.1
Diamonds 8.8 60.9 244.6
Exports as a
percent of
Imports 11.7 42.6 51.2
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982, no. 32,
Jerusalem.
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D. OTHER ASPECTS OF EFFECTIVENESS
Israeli trade with Western countries increased during the
years 1946 - 1973 as shown in Tables III, IV, and V. Since
international trade has many factors that influence it (e.g.,
inflation, rate of interest, etc.), it is useful to compare
the growth of Israel's trade with western countries and Japan
to the large Arab countries' trade with western countries and
Japan to attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the Arab
boycott on Israel.
The purpose of this section is to: (1) determine whether
change in the direction of the Arab boycott influenced the
trade of Israel and (2) determine whether decisions made to
blacklist many firms from one country had a real influence on
the trade with that country. Since Israel and the Arab
countries both had major trading relations with the U.S., and
because Japan was an important country with respect to the
boycott (its declarations differed from its real actions) , I
have chosen to evaluate the trade patterns of these two
countries in this chapter.
Since I have presented general data on Israel's trade
during this era in Tables III, IV, and V, I have chosen to
concentrate here on the years 1966 - 1970, as data was
available for this period to make the necessary comparison.
From Table VI, we see that Israel's imports from Japan
stayed roughly constant at about $2 million during the years
1966 - 1970, although Israeli exports to Japan more than
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Table VI. ISRAEL'S TRADE WITH THE U.S. AND JAPAN 1966 - 1970
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Year 66 67 68 69 70 66 67 68 69 70
Japan 21 18 14 18 20 12 16 18 20 28
U.S. 210 196 278 457 594 77 87 117 129 150
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1966
1970, International Monetary Fund, 1971.
doubled from $12 million in 1966 to $28 million by 1970.
We can see that Israeli trade with the U.S. more than
doubled in five years. In 1966 Israel imported goods in the
amount of $210 million, and by 1970 imports were $594 million.
In 1966 Israel exported to the U.S. $77 million in goods and
by 1970 the amount grew to $150 million.
The data in Table VI indicate that Israel's trade with the
U.S. as well as exports to Japan were booming, while Israel's
imports from Japan remained at about the same level. The
latter fact raises questions about the extent of the impact of
the Arab boycott on Israeli imports from Japan, and suggests
that the boycott was discouraging Japanese companies from
selling to Israel. This question will be addressed after
research of the trade of large Arab countries with Japan and
some political research.
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1. The Main Arab Countries Traders with Japan
Japan's position toward the Middle East was officially
neutral, as will be described below. In order to compare
trade between Japan and the Arab countries to that with
Israel, I will present the trade data as close as possible to
years that were available in Table VI from the International
Monetary Fund. Table VII presents two types of data. The
first type is Japanese trade with three biggest Arab trade
countries in this era. The second type is Japanese trade with
all the Arab countries.
Table VII. JAPAN AND THE ARAB WORLD TRADE 19 66 - 197
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
EXPORTS IMPORTS
1966 1970 1966 1970
Saudi Arabia 74.1 89.6 432.5 666.6
United Arab Emirates 11.8 37 20.6 117.5
Kuwait 48.1 94.9 290.4 308.3
TOTAL ARAB
COUNTRIES 1
264.7 347.1 856.2 1,269.4
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1966
- 1970, International Monetary Fund, 1971.
Note 1: These amounts do not include Iran. During
this period, Iran had trade relations with
Israel as well with Japan.
From Table VII it is not hard to see that Japan's
trade with the Arab world expanded impressively through the
years 1966 - 1970. In total, Japan's imports from Arab
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countries increased by 48.3 percent, from $856.2 million to
$1,269.4 million. Japan's exports to Arab countries increased
by 31 percent, from $264.7 million to $347.1 million.
2. The Main Arab Countries Traders with the U.S.
Table VIII presents two types of data. The first type
is U.S. trade with three biggest Arab trade countries in this
era. The second type is U.S. trade with all the Arab
countries
.
Table VIII. THE U.S. AND THE ARAB WORLD TRADE 1966 - 1970
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
EXPORTS IMPORTS
1966 1970 1966 1970
Saudi Arabia 152 140.8 95.6 19.7
United Arab Emirates 26.7 49.2 31.7 60.8
Egypt 189.3 80.7 17.8 22.9
TOTAL ARAB
COUNTRIES 1
671.7 508.1 212.3 154.7
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1966
- 1970, International Monetary Fund, 1971.
Note 1: These amounts do not include Iran. During
this period, Iran had trade relations with
Israel as well as with Japan.
Table VIII indicates that U.S. trade with the Arab
world decreased during the years 1966 -1970. In totals, the
U.S. imports from Arab countries decreased by 27 percent, from
$212.3 million to $154.7 million. U.S. exports to the Arab
25
world decreased by 24.4 percent, from $671.7 million to $508.1
million.
From the summary of Tables VI, VII and VIII it can be
concluded that Israel had problems with imports from Japan
compared to Arab countries' imports from Japan. Tables III,
IV and V have shown that, in general, Israeli imports from the
entire world tripled during the same years that its imports
from Japan decreased. On the other hand, the Arab world trade
(imports and exports) with the U.S. decreased while Israeli
trade with the U.S. increased dramatically.
In general, it can be concluded that, during the years
1966 - 1970, the Arab boycott did not achieve much success in
preventing trade between the U.S. and Israel, while the
freezing of imports from Japan to Israel during the same era
suggests that it had some impact on this aspect of Israeli
trade relations.
E. POLITICAL ANALYSIS
On July 26, 1951, Israel's ambassador to the U.N. , Abba
Eban, asked the U.N. Security Council to deal with the Arab
boycott and the Egyptian restriction of the Suez Canal.
[Ref. 31]
On September 1, 1951, the Security Council passed a
resolution which stated
"... that the restrictions on the passage of goods through
the Suez Canal to Israeli ports are denying to nations at
no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable
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supplies required for their economic reconstruction and
that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by
Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel's ports
represent unjustified interference with the rights of
nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one
another, including the Arab states and Israel".
[Ref. 32]
However, the Council did not succeed in enforcing the U.N.
resolution, since Egypt refused to obey.
As a result and in order to focus world attention, Israel
sent the Israeli ship 'Bat-Galim' to try to pass through the
Suez Canal. The ship came from Massawa in Eritrea and was
stopped by the Egyptians on September 28, 1954. The crew was
arrested and held until January 1, 1955, and the ship was
given to the Egyptian Navy. [Ref. 33]
The world attention which followed did not help Israel.
One of the main reasons for the 1956 War between Egypt and
Israel was the Suez Canal and access to Eilat port in the Red
Sea. After the 1956 War the Suez Canal was closed until 1957.
1. West German Reparations
The Arab League engaged in an extensive campaign to
convince West Germany to withdraw from the agreement to pay to
Israel $820 million over ten years. This agreement had been
signed on September 10, 1952. West Germany, which was flooded
with a wave of sorrow and regret for the killing of six
millions Jewish people in World War II, agreed to pay Israel
this sum of money in order to tie diplomatic relations and to
help the people who had survived. These funds would be used
27
to purchase German goods and services in order to settle Jews
victimized by the 'Nazis' . The Arab League threatened West
Germany with economic sanctions, but did not succeed in
stopping this agreement. West Germany was forced to pay
additional funds to Arab countries, in particular Egypt, to
avoid boycotts. [Ref . 34]
The Arab League decision to impose sanctions against
West Germany was the first time it had announced any kind of
boycott against a whole country's firms involved in delivering
goods to Israel. Nevertheless, opposition from German
industry and four political parties prompted the federal
government to buy off Arab hostility through extensive trade
credits, foreign aid, and technical assistance, particularly
to Egypt, which benefitted from the services of former Nazi
scientists in developing its military capability. West
Germany also delayed entering into diplomatic relations with
Israel until 1965. [Ref. 35]
2. Other Aspects of Israel's Response to the Boycott
In 1953, Israel established a research department to
gather all available information on the boycott. This
department found that in general, the CBO first blacklisted
companies least likely to resist, and put pressure on the
stronger companies later. [Ref. 36] The implication
of this was that Israel had little to lose from the boycott
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since the boycott was not likely to hurt companies which had
a strong resistance.
Israel responded to the anti -boycott policy with
secret steps, dealing with Western governments and especially
the U.S. Israel tried to secretly develop American
assistance. Writing in December 1966, Eric Pace, an American
New York Times journalist, made this observation about the
influence of the Arab boycott upon Israel
:
"Yet, for all the Boycott Committee's far-flung activity,
Israel officials are said to consider the boycott more of
a nuisance than a serious hobble on their country's
growth. . . Some Israelis are reported to contend that the
boycott has actually spurred aspects of their country's
growth by encouraging anti -Arab foreigners to do business
in Israel, and by obliging Israel to manufacture some
products, like light machinery, which it would otherwise
have been content to import." [Ref. 37]
Although 'nuisance' is an extremely mild term to be used by an
Israel official, the author would agree that Israel, pushed
into a corner, had to develop its own light machinery. Some
of this development became the first steps to create a
developed military industrial complex.
Israel, which had no other choice, invested many
efforts in creating its military industrial complex. After
the military embargo of France (1967) , the main supplier of
its aircraft, Israel developed military aircraft,- sea to sea
missiles and other missiles. Some of those missiles were very
effective against the Egyptian and Syrian fleets in the 1973
War.
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In 1971 Israel decided to close its anti boycott
department. It was felt the boycott was not effective and the
research department (anti boycott department) was no longer
needed. [Ref . 38]
3 . Israel and Japan
Interestingly, the "official" Japanese declaration of
policy on the Arab boycott was much different than its
practice. Officially, the Japanese view was as declared by
Yasihiko Nero, Consul General of Japan in New York:
"...The position of the Japanese Government has been from
the very beginning of the establishment of the Arab
Boycott Office, completely neutral. The Japanese
Government has, in the past, never encouraged or
discouraged any of the Japanese companies from trading
with either Israel or the Arab countries. Whether a
company has more leaning towards Israel or the Arab
countries is entirely up to each company concerned. . .The
company that is trading is thus assuming its own risks in
trading with any of the parties...". [Ref. 39]
In spite of this report, in practice we can see that
Japan's exports to Israel were low compared to Japanese trade
with the Arab countries, resulting in a trade surplus for the
Japanese (as shown in Tables VI and VII and their analysis
summary) . These conclusions suggest that the reason for the
freeze in Japanese exports to Israel was fear of the Arab
countries that supply Japan with 9 percent of their its oil.
In this way, Japan represented the first whole country that
surrendered to the boycott.
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F. U.S. RESPONSE TO THE BOYCOTT, 1946 - 1973
The United States in 1952 discriminated against Jews in
compliance with Arab boycott requirements. For example, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers acknowledged that it did not
recruit Jews for American funded defense construction projects
in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Jewish servicemen were not
permitted to be stationed at the U.S. air base in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia. The U.S. military advised that it was merely
adhering to Saudi Arabia's laws, which it could not
change. [Ref . 40]
In 1957 an event involving a tanker, the National Peace,
brought the U.S. government to cooperate with the Arab
boycott. The U.S. Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service
(MSTS) had chartered this vessel to carry fuel oil from Saudi
Arabia to the Philippines. Saudi officials refused permission
to load since this ship when under another name, had
previously carried on trade with Israel. The MSTS had to
charter another vessel and pay owners of the National Peace
$160,000 for damages. [Ref. 41]
In response to the increasingly blatant discrimination
against American Jews, and the Jewish organizations' publicity
about the discriminatory practices, the U.S. Senate adopted
the following resolution in 1956:
"Whereas it is a primary principle of our nation that
there shall be no distinction among U.S. citizens based on
their individual affiliations and since any attempt by
foreign nations to create such distinction among our
citizens in the granting of personal or commercial access
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or any other rights otherwise available to U.S. citizens
generally is inconsistent with our principles... Now,
therefore be it resolved that it is in the sense of the
Senate that it regards any such distinctions directed
against U.S. citizens as incompatible with the relations
that should exist among friendly nations and that in all
negotiations between the U.S. and any foreign state every
reasonable effort should be made to maintain this
principle". [Ref. 42]
As we have seen in the previous case of MSTS this resolution
had limited power.
In 19 65 the Senate and the House, after some hearings on
the boycott, voted to establish a simple requirement in which
American companies were required to report any requests they
received to participate in or cooperate with the Arab boycott.
Companies were still not prohibited from complying.
[Ref. 43]
It can be seen that since the American people felt no
direct effects of the boycott, there was little pressure in
the Congress to act against it. It may have been more
convenient to the U.S. not to take a formal position against
the boycott in order to be in a neutral position in the Middle
East and to not destroy American companies which traded with
Arab countries.
G. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the Primary Boycott achieved its main purpose
- to prevent any direct trade between Israel and the Arab
countries. The other boycotts (Secondary and Extended
Secondary Boycotts) failed to achieve their targets - to
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prevent any trade between Israel and the rest of the world.
However, they did freeze imports from Japan.
In the first round (1946-1973) of the economic and
political war between the Arab countries and Israel, no one
side came out on top. Although Israel was not destroyed
economically, it can be shown that Israel suffered from the
Arab boycott. Examples of this suffering include the oil
company boycott beginning in 1957 and the inability of Israel
to import oil from countries closer than Iran.
Although Israel suffered from the boycott, Israel had
considerable success as well. From Table III, IV, V, and VI
it can be concluded that Israeli exports and imports increased
impressively into the beginning of the seventies. Israel's
average annual GNP growth rate in real terms from 1950 to 1973
was as high as nine percent, one of the highest in the world.
All things considered, Israel did not pay a terribly heavy-
toll from the declaration of the Arab boycott. Two aspects
that were somewhat costly were: First, Egyptian restriction
of the Suez Canal on Israeli ships and foreign ships which
were trading with Israel since May 1948. Second, Japan froze
its exports to Israel.
By 1970, the Arab boycott was being enforced with little
consistency. It did not attack countries themselves, as
indicated in the analysis of West German Reparations, or even
companies which violated the boycott regulations consistently.
The latter conclusion is drawn from analysis and the summary
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of Table II which described 224 companies and 260 ships which
were deleted from the blacklist. Even though 60 countries had
companies on the blacklist by 1970, some of these countries
did much trading with Israel and with the Arab world as well.
An example was the United States which, on the one hand, had
11 percent of the blacklisted ships, while on the other hand,
led in trade with the Arab world and with Israel as well.
In spite of its declaration of a neutral position with
regards to the Middle East, Japan de-facto discouraged exports
to Israel, but kept importing goods such as diamonds, as shown
in Table VI. Japan did not increase its exports to Israel
from 1966 to 1970. On the other hand, its imports from
Israel more than doubled from $12 million to $28 million over
the same period. It can be concluded that in the case of
Japan, the Arab boycott was a partial success since Japan was
afraid to lose its source of oil.
The evidence indicates that any country that wanted to
trade with Israel was able to do it with little problem.
Japan did not much like the idea of trading with Israel since
it kept its imports frozen as Table VI indicates, but since
its citizens liked diamonds, Japan imported diamonds from
Israel in large amounts.
The boycott did not have one consistent policy for every
company and sector. By the year 1968, 224 branches and
companies which had been blacklisted were deleted. From this
evidence and from the facts that the CBO did not declare a
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boycott on states and countries themselves, I can conclude
that the boycott was a tool to use whenever it was convenient.
The Arab boycott did succeed with many blacklisted
companies by stopping their trade with Israel, and in some
instances Israel paid a very high price. The most expensive
price required importing of oil from far away while many
nearby Arab countries had plenty of oil
.
On the other hand, the boycott had the effect of
encouraging Israel to develop industry for some goods that no
one wanted to sell to them. Some military industries and
diamond industries helped Israel to build national self
reliance
.
As a result of my research of the U.S. response to the
boycott in this era, it appears that the U.S. did not have a
big interest in preventing the boycott in the U.S. - As a
result, no federal law was passed to prohibit participation in
boycotting Israel. On the one hand, even the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers cooperated with the boycott by not recruiting
Jews for American funded defense construction projects in
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Israel's trade with the U.S.
doubled in a period of four years (1966 -1970) . From this
data it can be concluded that the boycott was not effective in
regard to Israeli trade with the U.S.
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IV. FROM THE 1973 WAR UNTIL THE 1979 PEACE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT
The major purpose of this chapter will be to examine the
impact of the Arab boycott with respect to two main events in
this era- -the 1973 (Yom Kippur) War and the oil crisis of the
70' s. The Arab countries, encouraged by having surprised
Israel in the beginning of the 1973 War, created a new weapon
against the Western countries and Israel- -the oil embargo. As
a result of this embargo, many countries throughout the world
came to be involved indirectly in the Arab- Israeli crisis, or
at least took official positions. By the end of this era, in
1979, the first peace agreement was signed between an Arab
country - Egypt - and Israel
.
This chapter will analyze the boycott after the 1973 War,
focusing on economic and political effects of the boycott on
Israel. At the end of this chapter, the author will present
the U.S. response to the boycott and will end with
conclusions
.
A. THE 1973 WAR AND THE BEGINNING OF THE OIL EMBARGO
On Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, the most Holy day of the
Jews, Syria and Egypt invaded Israel. In tandem with this
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war, member governments of the OAPEC1 declared on October 17,
1973, that they were cutting production schedules below the
September level by a minimum of five percent in each
subsequent month. The latter declaration was effective -
"...until Israel withdrawal is completed from the whole
Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and the legal
rights of the Palestinian people are restored." (The U.S.
and the Netherlands were cut off completely from petroleum
exports for a few months, as will be described below.)
[Ref. 44]
There were many other factors that also caused the
escalation of oil prices, and the 1973 war was only a minor
one, but its timing was very important. The other main
factors were the demand for oil, given declining output
outside of OPEC, which raised the proportion of world output
originating in OPEC and Libya's President Qadaffi beginning in
1971 to press OPEC to raise oil prices. [Ref. 45]
Israel was the only country which could, in fact, give the
Arab countries some of the objectives they requested, so if
these were the real goals, Israel was the real target. The
U.S. was embargoed to induce it to persuade Israel to change
its policy and because of its uncompromising position against
the Arab boycott. The logic in embargoing the other Western
countries is even more complex, since they could not by
themselves alter Israel's policy. They were apparently
1 OAPEC is the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries, created in 1968 and made up of only the Arab countries
of OPEC.
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supposed to bring pressure on the U.S. to persuade Israel to
alter its policy. [Ref. 46]
The Netherlands also had an uncompromising official
position against the Arab boycott of Israel. As a result of
the OAPEC declaration of October 17, 1973, the U.S. and the
Netherlands were cut off completely from petroleum exports
from Abu Dhabi, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, Katar
and Oman. [Ref. 47]
This was the signal to open the race of oil price
escalations. On October 16, 1973, one day before the OAPEC
declaration, the Arab countries' friends in OPEC raised the
price for a barrel of crude oil from $3.01 to $5. 12 --an
increase of almost 70 percent. But this was only the
beginning. On January 1, 1974, they declared a new price of
$11.65 (an increase of 387 percent in less than three months)
.
The total increase in the price of oil from 1970 ($1.80 a
barrel) to 1974 ($11.65 a barrel) was 650 percent.
[Ref. 48]
The escalation caused a severe economic impact in Western
Europe and the U.S. This strong economic crisis brought an
unprecedented economic situation of high inflation, high
unemployment (stagflation)
,
and a huge deficit in the U.S. and
other Western countries.
The oil crisis worked in the opposite direction on the
Arab countries. It was estimated by Time, The Weekly
Newsmagazine that a total of $112 billion were collectively
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earned by 13 countries of OPEC in 19 74 because of the oil
price escalation. [Ref. 49]
The Arab oil countries began to become very rich. But the
CBO was not directly responsible for this increase in oil
prices, since the rise in prices began when Western and
American negotiators for oil prices left the Vienna oil prices
conference, in early October 1973. [Ref. 50]
At that time the oil -exporting Arab countries, which were
lacking developed infrastructures, began to spend their income
to increase development. By 1980 it was estimated that these
nations allocated about $450 billion for foreign investment in
the U.S., Japan and Western Europe. [Ref. 51] This
new flow of money called for many companies from the U.S.,
Japan and Western Europe to develop trade relationships for
goods and investments.
After the 1973 War, but not only because of it, the work
of the CBO began to expand rapidly. First, as mentioned
earlier, the weapon of oil exports became more influential and
was used to threaten a country by raising prices or stopping
exports. Second, the trade of the Arab countries increased
rapidly (as will be described below) and many companies which
traded with Israel had to choose among the alternatives. In
many cases the alternatives were to trade with Israel and go




We know remarkably little about the way in which the Arab
governments and the CBO function in Israel, Western Europe and
the U.S. We do not have access to the memories of the Arabs'
key decision makers and their assistants, as we do to Western
leaders' memories which appear in the West almost as they
leave office. We do not have a free journalism in the Arab
world to work as an effective adversary to government,
routinely publishing secret information. Moreover, both the
actors (the Arab countries) and the target (Israel) government
have attempted to hide crucial aspects of the influential
relationship.
In addition, as will be described below, Israel's trade
relations were developed rapidly, during this period. If we
had tried to analyze only Israel's economic status, a mistaken
conclusion could be reached that the Arab boycott of Israel
had little impact on Israel's trade in this era. But the
political analysis and the comparison of Israel's trade with
Arab countries' trade will change this picture, as will be
described below.
Finally, the economy of Israel was influenced by many
factors that cannot be measured separately, such as inflation,
currency rates, etc. As a result, the author chose to develop
his research by analyzing Israel's trade with the main Western
countries and Japan, and to attempt to evaluate the
effectiveness of the Arab boycott of Israel by comparing the
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Arab countries' trade with the main Western countries and
Japan
.
The major purpose of this economic analysis is to
emphasize the big picture of Israel's trade with the main
Western countries and Japan and to attempt to evaluate the
Arab boycott's impact on it. Other factors which have also
impacted Israel's trade, such as currency rates, inflation
etc., are not measured separately.
Table IX. ISRAELI IMPORTS FROM MAJOR COUNTRIES 1973 - 1979
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
TOTAL 4240 5439 5999 5667 5787 7403 8332
U.S. 549 754 999 888 981 1126 1512
GERMANY 512 687 436 417 447 594 768
U.K. 479 543 578 609 463 542 688
JAPAN 59 130 89 107 125 123 170
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1973
1979, International Monetary Fund, 1980.
C. GENERAL ANALYSIS OP ISRAELI TRADE, 1973 - 1979
The data which are provided in Table IX indicate that
during the years 1973 - 1979, Israel's total imports rose by
96 percent, from $4.24 billion in 1973 to $8,331 billion in
1979. In 1976, imports declined by 5 . 5 percent fox only one
year.
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Table X. ISRAELI EXPORTS TO MAJOR COUNTRIES 1973 1979
(in milli ons of U . S. dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
TOTAL 1459 1825 1941 2415 3083 3911 4553
U.S. 267 306 307 437 569 688 749
GERMANY 136 135 160 199 274 331 419
U.K. 139 157 171 180 226 282 394
JAPAN 87 65 99 73 99 181 223
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1973
1979, International Monetary Fund, 1980.
From Table X it can be seen that during the years 1973 -
1979, Israel's total exports increased by 212 percent- -from
$1,459 billion in 1973 to $4,553 billion in 1979. Comparison
of total exports to total imports indicates that total exports
increased more than total imports, but the gap in the trade
deficit stayed very large. In 1973, the trade deficit was
$2,781 billion. This amount was larger than total exports
($1,459 billion) at that time. In terms of percentage, it was
65 percent of total imports. In 1979, the trade deficit was
$3,778 billion (a total of 45 percent of imports).
1. Israeli Trade with the U.S., 1973 - 1979
Table IX indicates that Israel's imports from the U.S.
increased by 81.7 percent from 1973 until 1975. In 1976,
imports declined by 11 percent, from $999 million in 1975 to
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$888 million in 1976. From 1977 until 1979, Israel's imports
from the U.S. increased by 70 percent. Total imports from the
U.S. to Israel increased by 175 percent from 1973 to 1979-
-
from $549 million in 1973 to $1,512 billion in 1979. In 1979,
the U.S. claimed 18.15 percent of total imports to Israel, up
from six percent in 1973.
From Table X it can be seen that Israeli exports to
the U.S. increased by 180 percent from 1973 to 1979- -from $267
million in 1973 to $749 million in 1979. In 1973, Israeli
exports to the U.S. made up 18 percent of total Israeli
exports. In 1979, Israeli exports to the U.S. made up 16.4
percent of total Israeli exports.
2. Israeli Trade with West Germany, 1973 - 1979
Table IX indicates that Israel's total imports from
West Germany increased by 50 percent from 1973 to 1979. In
1973, Israel imported goods in the amount of $512 million. By
1979, this amount grew to $768 million. In the years 1975 and
19 76, Israel's imports from West Germany declined by 3 7
percent from 1974. In 1975, imports decreased by $251 million
from 1974. In 1976 imports declined again. In 1977, Israel's
imports from West Germany began to increase again. In 1979,
West Germany held 9.2 percent of total Israeli imports, while
in 1973 West Germany had 12 percent of the import market.
Table X shows that Israel's exports to West Germany
increased by 207 percent from 1973 to 1979. In 1973, Israel's
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exports to West Germany were $136 million and in 1979 they
increased to $419 million. In 1974, the export decline was
related to the 1973 War.
3. Israeli Trade with the U.K., 1973 - 1979
Table IX indicates that the U.K. held 8.3 percent of
Israel's total import market in 1979. In 1973, the U.K. had
11.3 percent of Israel's import market. From 1973 to 1976
Israel's imports from the U.K. increased by 27 percent- -from
$479 million in 1973 to $609 million in 1976. In 1977,
Israel's imports from the U.K. declined by 23.9 percent
relative to 1976, with $463 million. From 1978, Israel's
imports began to grow again and by 1979, Israel imported goods
in the amount of $688 million from the U.K., for a total
increase from 1973 of 43.6 percent.
From Table X it can be seen that Israel's exports to
the U.K. increased by 184 percent- -from $139 million in 1973
to $394 million in 1979.
4. Israeli Trade with Japan, 1973 - 1979
Table IX indicates that Israel's imports from Japan
increased by 186 percent, with $59 million in 1973 and $170
million in 1979. An increase in imports occurred in 1974 (120
percent) , but in 1975 a large decline in imports occurred (32
percent) --to $89 million. From 1975, Israel's imports from
Japan began to increase again. In 1979, Japan had two percent
of Israel's total imports versus 1.4 percent in 1973.
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From Table X it can be seen that Israel's exports to
Japan increased by 156 percent from 1973 (with $87 million) to
1979 (with $223 million) . In two years of this era, Israel
had reduced exports to Japan. In 1974, a decrease of 225
percent in exports to Japan occurred (with $65 million)
relative to 1973 (with $87 million) , and in 1976 a decrease of
27 percent from 1975 occurred.
In summary, although Israel experienced a considerable
increase in exports during this period, the basic problem of
the trade deficit was the increase in imported goods.
However, when we try to evaluate the effectiveness of the Arab
boycott of Israel, the trade deficit suggests that the Arab
boycott failed in achieving its goals. It is clear evidence
that if the Israeli deficit increased, so did Israeli imports.
Since Israeli imports increased more than its exports, the
Arab boycott was not fully effective. But in order to get as
precise a picture as possible, we have to compare Israeli
trade to other factors. In this paper the author compares
Israel's trade to select Arab countries' trade. This thesis
does not concentrate on Israel's unique economic problems in
terms of its trade deficit. Rather, it tries to identify the
impact of the Arab boycott of Israel on Israel's economy. One
of the major targets of the Arab boycott was and still is to
prevent any trade with Israel by non Arab countries as well as
by Arab countries. The preceding analysis of Israeli trade
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indicates that the Arab boycott of Israel had only partial
success in achieving its goals during the years 1973 - 1979.
5. The Main Arab Country Traders with Japan
As explained at the beginning of this analysis, in
order to compare trade between Japan and the Arab countries to
that with Israel in this era, and to the previous era (1946 -
19 73), it is necessary to present the trade data as close as
possible to the span of years that were presented in Tables IX
and X. Table XI presents Japanese trade with the three
largest Arab trading countries in this era.
Table XI. TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND SELECT ARAB COUNTRIES 1973 -
1979
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1973 1976 1979 1973 1976 1979
Saudi Arabia 1390 7836 12037 389 1892 3802
United Arab
Emirates 553 2472 3612 163 637 1038
Iraq 3 579 1799 49 626 1600
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1973
1979, International Monetary Fund, 1980.
From Table XI it can be seen that Japan's imports from
Saudi Arabia increased almost nine times the $1.39 billion in
1973 to $12,037 billion in 1979. Japan increased its exports
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to Saudi Arabia by 10 times from 1973 with $389 million to
$3,802 billion in 1979.
Japan's imports from Iraq in these years multiplied by
600 times, from only three million dollars in 1973 to $1,799
million in 1979. Japan's exports to Iraq also multiplied by
more than 32 times, from $49 million in 1973 to $1,600 million
in 1979. Similar trade conditions existed between Japan and
other Arab countries that exported oil
.
During this period, Japan was dependent upon the Arab
countries for 90 percent of its oil imports. This will be
described more fully below. An interesting point to remember
is that the Arab countries were the only countries that Japan
had a trade deficit with, except for Israel.
The Arab countries' trade with Japan increased by at
least 9 00 percent as was described in the case of Saudi Arabia
trade with Japan, and Japan's exports to Iraq increased by
more than 3,2 00 percent. In comparing this analysis to
Israel's trade with Japan (as described in analysis of Tables
IX and X), it can be concluded that although Israel's trade
with Japan increased by more than 100% during the years 19 73
- 1979, it was still far below the Arab countries' trade
expansion.
As presented in the beginning of this chapter, the
reason for the huge expansion in Arab trade with Japan was the
increase in oil prices. Japan, which was more dependent on
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Arab oil in this era, as is described below, was afraid to
deal with the Arab boycott.
By comparing select Arab countries' trade with Japan
and Israel's trade with Japan, and connecting it to the
political analysis, it is quite evident that the Arab boycott
of Israel in the case of Japan became worse after 1973.
Israeli exports to Japan decreased significantly twice. In
1974, Israeli exports to Japan decreased by 225 percent from
the 1974 level. In 1976, Israeli exports to Japan decreased
by 27 percent from the 1975 level. Israeli imports from Japan
decreased by 32 percent in 1975 from the 1974 level. During
this same period, Arab countries' trade with Japan was
booming
.
6. The Main Arab Country Traders with the U.S.
Table XII presents the U.S. trade with the main Arab
countries in this time period. As was explained in the
beginning of the economic analysis, in order to evaluate U.S.
trade with Israel in this era and to compare it to the
previous chapter, Table XII presents some data on trade
between the U.S. and some Arab countries which exported oil
and some Arab countries which did not export oil (such as
Egypt and Syria)
.
Table XII indicates that U.S. imports from Egypt
increased by almost 14 times from 1973 to 1979. In 1973, the
U.S. imported $28 million from Egypt and by 1979 its imports
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Table XII. TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SELECT ARAB COUNTRIES
1973 - 1979
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1973 1976 1979 1973 1976 1979
EGYPT 28 111 413 225 810 1433
SYRIA 7 10 173 21 275 230
SAUDI ARABIA 545 5847 8730 442 2774 4875
LIBYA1 229 2406 5544 104 277 468
IRAQ2 17 123 671 56 382 442
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1973
- 1979, International Monetary Fund, 1980.
Note 1: In 1974, U.S. imports from Libya declined to
one million dollars, for only one year.
Note 2: In 1974, U.S. imports from Iraq declined to
one million dollars, for only one year.
rose to $413 million. At the same time, U.S. exports to Egypt
in 1979 amounted to $1,433 billion. This was six times more
than in 1973 ($225 million)
.
U.S. imports from Syria increased more than 24 times
the 1973 total in the period from 1973 to 1979. In 1973, the
U.S. imported from Syria in the amount of seven million
dollars, and by 1979 it increased to $173 million. In 1973,
U.S. exports to Syria were $21 million and in 1979, they grew
to $230 million, more than ten times higher. In 1979, the
year of the peace talks between Israel and Egypt, U.S. exports
to Syria declined from 1978.
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Table XII indicates that U.S. imports from Saudi
Arabia increased 16 times the 1973 total by 1979. In 1973,
U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia were $545 million and by 1979
they had increased to $8.73 billion. In 1973, U.S. exports to
Saudi Arabia were $442 million and by 1979, exports rose to
$4,875 billion, about 11 times the 1973 total.
Table XII indicates that U.S. imports from Libya
increased more than 24 times during the years 1973 to 1979.
In 1973, U.S. imports from Libya totalled $229 million and by
1979 imports had grown to $5,544 billion. In 1979, the U.S.
exported to Libya a total of $468 million- -more than four
times the 1973 total of $104 million.
From Table XII it can be seen that in the year 1979,
U.S. imports from Iraq totalled $671 million- -39 times higher
than the amount in 1973 of $17 million. In 1979, U.S. exports
to Iraq were $442 million- -more than seven times the amount
that was exported in 1973 ($56 million)
.
In summary, it is evident that the U.S. significantly
increased its trade with Arab countries during the years 1973
- 1979. In connecting it to the political analysis of the
U.S. response to the Arab boycott and in comparing it to the
economic analysis of Israel' trade, one conclusion can be
drawn. U.S. legislative actions against the Arab boycott did
not significantly increase Israeli trade with the U.S. as
compared to Arab countries' increase in trade (regarding U.S.
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legislative actions, see below, "U.S. Response to the Arab
Boycott, 1973 - 1979")
.
To further illustrate the strength of the position of
the Arab countries which boycotted Israel, two additional
perspectives are relevant.
First, in comparing U.S. trade with the Arab world to
U.S. trade with Israel (as was presented in Tables IX and X
and their analysis), it can be concluded that although U.S.
trade with Israel increased by more than 100%, this was far
below the U.S. trade increase with the Arab countries,
including non-oil exporting countries such as Egypt and Syria.
The U.S. trade with Arab countries increased by at least six
times, as was the case with Egypt, or by 39 times as was the
case of Iraq's imports.
Second, Israel had a strong trade position in 1973 as
compared to Egypt. For example, from Tables IX, X and XII it
can be seen that in 1973, U.S exports to Egypt ($225 million)
were 41 percent of U.S. exports to Israel ($549 million) . But
in 1979, U.S. exports to Egypt were almost the same as exports
to Israel- -about $1.5 billion. These data support the
political analysis which suggests that Israel's strong
position in the U.S. declined in comparison to the Arab
countries' position for two main reasons. The two reasons are
the oil crisis and the Arab boycott. These reasons are
described more fully below.
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Table XIII. NUMBER OF BLACKLISTED COMPANIES AND SHIPS FOR TEN






United States 1,897 32
Britain 1, 158 75
France 357 -
Canada 250 • -
Turkey 226 18




India 12 8 -
Other 59 Countries 1618 438
TOTAL 69 COUNTRIES 6376 634
Source: Edward Hotaling, The Arab Blacklist Unveiled,
Landia Publishing company, California, 1977.
7. Analysis of Companies and Ships Blacklisted by 1976
1976 was the last year that data on the number of
companies and ships blacklisted by the CBO were available.
From Table XIII it can be seen that by 19 76 there were 6,3 76
companies and organizations and 634 ships from 69 countries
blacklisted. The list included companies of both small and
large size. The country which had the most ships blacklisted
was Greece with 128 ships. Liberia was second with 105 ships.
The U.S. and Britain had the most companies and organizations
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blacklisted with more than 1,000 companies each.
[Ref. 52]
Comparing the blacklist in 1968 to the blacklist in
1976 and their analysis (Table II and Table XIII) , it can be
concluded that the CBO enlarged its power by increasing the
blacklist by about three times the number in eight years (from
2,462 companies in 1968 to 6,376 companies in 1976). The
reasons for this growth are discussed in the political
analysis below.
D. POLITICAL ANALYSIS
The oil crisis and the threat by the Arab oil producers of
imposing an oil embargo on states which were in favor of
Israel following the 1973 War gave the Arab boycott a renewed
lease on life. [Ref. 53]
Toward the end of February 1975, the Arab League adopted
a resolution to intensify the Arab boycott of Israel.
[Ref. 54] In reply to a question by a Kneset (Israel
parliament) member, Eliezer Shostak, on the subject of the
Arab boycott, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yigal Alon announced
to the Kneset on February 19, 19 75 that the government of
Israel had been raising the issue in all meetings with
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economics from various
Western countries including the U.S. [Ref. 55]
"...we drew their attention to the fact that the
intensification of the Arab boycott is totally at cross
purposes with the aspiration to advance towards peace in
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the region, in addition to the fact that this boycott, by-
its mere essence, does not correspond with all that the
free states in the world symbolize. We have called upon
our interlocutors to act vigorously on this issue, and we
believe that we shall see decisive action by Western
states, and especially the U.S." [Ref. 56]
As a result of increasing oil prices and the oil crisis,
the European community and Israel signed a Free Trade
Agreement on May 11, 1975. The nine member countries wanted
to show the Arab countries that they were not ready to be
pushed to the corner by the oil embargo. [Ref. 57]
It can be concluded that in this case, the Arab boycott lost
its effectiveness and helped Israel to get involved in
agreements which improved its European trade.
In the U.S., Israel's Minister of Industry and Trade,
Chaim Bar- Lev, said during a visit in 1975 :
"... the Arab threats to boycott companies which do
business with Israel are, to a certain extent, shadows of
mountains rather than mountains." [Ref. 58]
In answer to a question in the Israeli Kneset about this
statement, Bar- Lev answered:
"In meeting with the media after my talk with the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Roger Morton I tried to create a
balanced picture of the situation. . . " On the one hand, he
tried not to discourage American companies from
maintaining economic ties with Israel (since 200 American
companies have had economic relations with Israel) and on
the other hand he pointed out that the boycott caused
Israel real damage. [Ref. 59]
Chaim Herzog (today the Israeli President) criticized
Israel's government in an article in the Jerusalem Post for
not doing anything on the boycott issue.
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"Both before the Yom Kippur War when the first clear signs
were apparent of the Arab world's preparation to employ
the oil weapon, and soon after the end of the war, the
present writer suggested in these columns the
establishment of an international Jewish Economic
Organization to spearhead a world counterattack against
the Arab boycott and those who submit to it ... Then
Minister of Finance appointed a committee to examine the
subject, but there is no more effective means of
postponing action than the appointment of a committee.
The fact is that nothing has since been heard in public as
to activity by the Government in this Matter. . . Because in
all the years of the state's existence, there has been
insufficient appreciation of the importance of this
subject. No instrument has been created capable of
reacting in economic warfare and affording leadership and
direction to world jury in this struggle".
[Ref. 60]
From the reactions of both Israel's Minister of Industry
and Trade and Chaim Herzog, we can see that until 1975, not
much had effectively been done by Israel. One more point to
concentrate upon is that Israel acknowledged its problem of
the damage being done by the boycott.
In July 1975, Israel established the Economic Warfare
Authority under the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
Authority had a small staff and a public committee which was
created by representatives of industry. Halperin, second
director of the Economic Warfare Authority, said in his book
Combatting The Arab Boycott,
"
... I think it would be true to say that before 1973
people in Israel looked at the boycott as a nuisance. .
.
But after 1973 we all realized that the boycott is not
only a problem but a danger as well.... this time the
conclusion was in favor of action". [Ref. 61]
The Western countries suffered severely from the oil
embargo after 1973. During the same period, Israel also
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suffered from the Arab boycott. The logic behind the
conclusion that after 1975 Israel had to act against the
boycott, was that it would be easier for Western countries to
join in Israel's actions against the Arab boycott because the
Western countries suffered from the actions of the Arab
countries as well. [Ref. 62]
Israel believed at that time that the more noise one made
about the issue, both in Israel and abroad, the easier it
would be to bring about the adoption of practical measures to
combat the boycott by Western countries. This approach was
intended to convince public opinion in North America and
Europe that the West could and should stand against the Arab
boycott. [Ref. 63]
Halperin interpreted the underlying approach in the U.S.:
"The precondition for success of the anti -boycott action
in the U.S. was that it should not be perceived as an
Israeli issue, but as an American one. Thus, while
Israelis have been very visible in the anti -boycott
campaigns in some other countries ... we kept out of the
limelight in the U.S." [Ref. 64]
As a result of Israeli and Jewish organizations' actions
in the U.S., the Arab boycott was declared illegal in the U.S.
and in several European countries. [Ref. 65] But in
actuality, a company in the U.S. could surrender to the
boycott and pay a fine of $10,000. Some companies
intentionally paid it. This point will be developed further
in the paragraph about the U.S. response to the Arab boycott.
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In the Western countries, strong public opinion can move
legislators to act in favor of an issue. The Economic Warfare
Authority attempted to achieve strong public opinion against
the Arab boycott in the U.S. and Western Europe. In the U.S.,
these actions began by mobilizing all three major American
Jewish organizations (Anti- defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish
Congress) . These organizations had dealt with the boycott
since the early 1960's but had been hampered before 1973 by
Israel's policy of keeping a low profile on the boycott issue.
[Ref. 66]
Several months after the establishment of the Economic
Warfare Authority, a panel of eminent international jurists
ruled in October 19 75 that economic boycotts and embargoes
levelled against third party countries for political reasons
were illegal under international law, and the countries
imposing economic boycotts and embargoes must pay reparations
to third party states financially injured by the
discriminatory actions. [Ref. 67] In spite of this
decision, there was no practical implementation, but it was
important for diplomatic reasons.
It can be concluded that Israel accepted the Arab boycott
as a threat beginning in 19 73, and began to deal with the
boycott more seriously from 1975 with the establishment of the
Economic Warfare Authority. From the analysis provided in
this section and from the section discussing the U.S. response
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to the Arab boycott, it is evident that something changed in
the Israeli reaction to the Arab boycott. (Recall also, from
the economic analysis, that Arab countries' trade improved in
this era; Israel suffered from trade problems)
.
1. Japanese Surrender to the Boycott
The value of the oil imported by Japan from Arab
countries in this era amounted to 9 percent of its oil needs.
Business was booming for Japanese companies selling products
to the rich Arab countries . Japanese companies preferred to
trade with Arab countries with markets with hundreds of
millions of consumers rather than with Israel with less than
four million people. The answer received by Israeli dealers
who asked Toyota and Datsun automobile companies why they
would not export their cars to Israel was that the car makers
"had a shortage of production." [Ref. 68]
Some Japanese companies found underground means to
trade with Israel by exporting through Western Europe and by
using a third side company. Thus it was possible in those
days to find Seiko watches, Canon and Olympus cameras, Sony
electronics equipment and many other Japanese products in
Israel. One car company in particular achieved success in
Israel . Subaru was the only Japanese car imported to Israel
at this time. [Ref. 69]
The evidence then, suggests that Japan surrendered to
the Arab boycott.
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2 . Israel and Africa Relations
Prior to the 1973 War, Israel developed very good
diplomatic relationships with African countries. After the
1973 War, all African countries except three broke off
diplomatic relations with Israel. Until the 1973 War, Israel
had helped many African countries to develop their agriculture
and their military. After the war, Israeli companies were
asked to leave the countries.
The threat to developing African countries of lost
OAPEC aid and the Arab market encouraged these countries to
cut diplomatic relations with Israel. One example was the CBO
threat to boycott exports from these poor countries. Another
example was the CBO threat to stop delivering oil to these
African countries. The Arab boycott with the oil power threat
succeeded well in this case. [Ref . 70]
E. U.S. RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT, 1973 - 1979
The main factor affecting the U.S. response to the boycott
was the oil crisis and its byproducts of high inflation,
increased deficits, and high unemployment (stagflation) . When
OPEC imposed an embargo on the shipment of oil to the U.S.
because of American military support to Israel during the 1973
War, great pressure was placed on Congress to deal with the
oil crisis and the Arab boycott. The boycott issue was
presented by the Jewish organizations as a domestic American
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concern and not just a concern of Israel (as described on page
56) . [Ref . 71]
On the other hand, President Gerald Ford had been
convinced by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the
goodwill of the Arab countries needed to be cultivated to
benefit U.S. efforts to facilitate a Middle East peace
settlement. This meant that new legislative measures against
the Arab trade boycott would be opposed by the administration,
since it was feared they could provoke Arab hostility toward
the U.S. As a result, the Ford administration tried to block
congressional action until 1977. [Ref. 72]
In February 1975, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
published a list of 1,500 American companies that were on the
Arab blacklist. The House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation reported that in 1975 alone, $4.4
billion worth of U.S. sales to Arab countries were subject to
boycott requests. [Ref. 73]
A report issued by the Commerce Department showed that
2,213 firms reported 118,627 boycott -related requests to
comply with the boycott in 1976. [Ref. 74]
In 1975, 12 states responded by legislating specific anti-
boycott statutes. The statutes ranged from broad laws
prohibiting discrimination, boycotts and blacklists (as in New




Senator Abraham Ribicoff sponsored an anti -boycott
amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 19 76 which penalized
boycott compliance but did not prohibit it. This amendment
affected only those taxpayers who sought foreign tax benefits
while cooperating with a foreign boycott. [Ref . 76]
More specifically, the taxpayers could suffer from losing
three tax benefits:
1. Loss of foreign tax credits (Sec. 908);
2. Inability to claim a tax deferral on unrepatriated
foreign income earned in boycott countries (Sec, 952 (a)
(3) (B));
3. Loss of the deferral of U.S. tax with respect to Domestic
International Sales Corporation (DISC) income (Sec. 995
(b) (1) (F) ) . [Ref. 77]
Firms were required to report to the IRS all business with
any of the boycott countries as part of their annual tax
return. This amendment to the Tax Reform Act was approved,
since President Ford decided not to veto the tax bill on the
eve of the presidential elections. [Ref. 78] The
international boycott provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.") were signed into law by President Ford on October
4, 1976, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
[Ref. 79]
In the 1976 presidential campaign, Governor Jimmy Carter
announced his support for legislation barring U.S. compliance
with secondary and tertiary Arab boycott requirements. After
Carter's victory, the Congress had problems with elements
within the American business community that opposed
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legislation against the boycott. Some business leaders worked
to weaken and restrict the impact of this legislation. After
a long period of negotiation among all sides, on June 22,
1977, President Carter signed into law comprehensive anti-
boycott legislation in the form of amendments to the Export
Administration Act. [Ref . 80]
These 1977 amendments attempted to prohibit compliance
with, or participation in, the secondary or tertiary Arab
boycott of Israel by Americans or persons doing business in
the U.S. The amendments permitted Americans to comply with
the primary boycott since the U.S. itself had primary boycotts
on another foreign country (South Africa) . The amendments
stated that a violation of the boycott may result in a fine
not to exceed $50,000. [Ref. 81]
Examination of U.S. legislation against the boycott
provides understanding of the strength of the leverage of the
Arab countries with the power of oil. On the one hand, a
strong Jewish lobby tried to bring the U.S. Congress to
legislate a major prohibition against the boycott. On the
other hand, the fear of losing more money to other Western
countries from trade cuts with the Arab countries, and the
effective pressure of the business community brought the
Congress to the 1977 compromise amendments. These amendments
prohibited the secondary and tertiary boycott, but many
companies preferred to pay the fine of $50,000 and to
surrender to the Arab boycott. [Ref. 82]
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F. CONCLUSIONS
In the second round of the Arab boycott of Israel, neither
side really won; both achieved some successes and failures.
The CBO did not succeed in destroying Israel's economy as
it had declared it would do, although Israel had many economic
problems at this time. Some of the problems were related
directly to the CBO, but some of them were related to the Arab
boycott indirectly. For example, the African market that was
for Israel a big place for exports, was closed after the 1973
War by pressure of Arab countries
.
The oil embargo on the Western countries caused a new
threat to Israel. On the one hand, Israel had difficulty
trading with many companies and countries that were targeted
by the embargo (like Japan) . But on the other hand, Israel
gained export contracts that it could not achieve before (for
example, the Free Trade Agreement with nine Western European
countries)
.
In spite of the fact that Israel's imports and exports
rose by more than 100 percent in this era, we cannot conclude
that Israel did not suffer from the Arab boycott. From the
explanations provided in the beginning of the economic
analysis, and by comparing Israel's trade to Arab countries'
trade, we must also observe the fact that the Arab countries
at the same time increased trade by hundreds of percent, even
including Arab countries that did not export oil (like Egypt
and Syria)
63
Over a period of 29 years, Israel basically ignored the
Arab boycott and no serious action took place by Israel's
government. The Kneset did not develop any committee or
subcommittee to deal with the Arab boycott. Israel's
government, except for talking from time to time with Western
Ministers, also took no serious action. The first time Israel
dealt with the boycott seriously was in 1975, by establishing
the Anti -Boycott Authority. Still, only seven people worked
in this office compared to 200 in the CBO and many others in
the Arab countries' Regional Offices. From these facts, we
can conclude that Israel considered the boycott as a threat
only from 1975 (after the oil crisis) . But, it may also be
the case that Israel simply did not have enough resources to
deal with it more dramatically.
Israel had received aid from the U.S. and a few Western
countries declared the boycott illegal and prohibited their
companies from complying with it. Although some companies did
surrender to the boycott and intentionally paid a fine, the
Arab boycott had a new obstacle to fight rather than just
Israel
.
The Arab countries changed the rules of the trade game by
declaring for the first time an oil embargo on the U.S. and
some European countries, forcing these countries to react.
Although the oil embargo on the U.S. only lasted a short time,
it opened the door to legislation against the boycott.
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In summary, between 1973 and 1979, the Arab boycott
changed its appearance and achieved international
effectiveness largely as a result of the power of oil. In
this era, Israel began to be seriously threatened by the Arab
boycott. Use of Arab oil as a weapon in 1973 may be viewed as
a turning point in the effectiveness of the Arab boycott.
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V. THE ARAB BOYCOTT FROM THE 1979 PEACE AGREEMENT
UNTIL 1990
The result of the 19 79 peace agreement between Israel and
Egypt was a lifting of the Arab boycott by at least one Arab
country, Egypt. The major purpose of this chapter will be to
examine the impact of the peace agreement on the Arab boycott
of Israel and on Egypt's trade with Israel.
This chapter will evaluate Israel's trade with Egypt and
other major trading countries in the world. After the
economic analysis, this chapter will provide a political
analysis of Israel and present research on the U.S. response
to the Arab boycott in this era.
The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, signed in
1979 at Camp David in the U.S., gave Israel many expectations
about a trade increase, at least with the biggest Arab
country, Egypt. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement,
Egypt had a lot of influence on most of the Arab countries.
Under this peace agreement, Israel gave back to Egypt the
Sinai peninsula, including new oil fields developed by Israel
just a few years before. Under the peace agreement, Egypt had
to give Israel the opportunity to buy oil from the new oil
fields, and permits to pass through the Suez Canal. (Recall
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that the Suez Canal had been closed after the 19 67 War until
1975, and from the 1956 War until 1957) . After the peace
agreement was signed, the Arab countries (except for Egypt)
,
led by Syria and Libya, still did not agree to any trade with
Israel and imposed a limited embargo on Egypt.
[Ref. 83]
In 19 79, another major factor was changed - Iran. Until
1979, Iran was controlled by a non-religious Moslem regime led
by the Shah. The Shah believed that good relationships with
Israel would help him to develop good trade relations with the
Western world, particularly with the U.S. Iran was the only
Moslem country that was not a member of the Arab boycott of
Israel. By 1979, Israel exported military equipment and
imported oil from Iran.
After Khomeni came to power, Israel lost a big market for
exports and more importantly, lost oil imports from Iran.
During that time, Israel suffered an economic hit, but
increasing supplies of oil in the 1980 's, and the new peace
agreement, with an opportunity to import oil from Egypt,
solved at least the oil problem. [Ref. 84]
In 19 85, Israel and the U.S. began an era of full
implementation of a Free Trade Region which was -supposed to




As in previous chapters, to evaluate the effectiveness of
the Arab boycott on Israel, it is useful to compare the growth
of Israel's trade with Western countries and Japan to the
large Arab countries' trade with Western countries and Japan.
The purpose of this section is: (1) To determine whether
a change in the direction of the Arab boycott (after the peace
agreement between Israel and Egypt) influenced the trade of
Israel; (2) To determine whether legislative acts made by the
U.S. Congress against the Arab boycott had a real influence on
the trade with Israel, as compared to Arab countries; and (3)
(Since Japan is a different industrial country with regard to
the Arab boycott), to evaluate Japan's trade relations with
Israel and Arab countries. The tables are built in patterns
of every two years
.
B. ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI TRADE, 1979 - 1990
The data provided in Table XIV indicate that during the
years 1979 - 1990, Israel's total imports increased by 98
percent- -from $8,332 billion in 1979 to $16,508 billion in
1990. In 1983, Israel's total imports declined by 6 percent
for one year. During the years 1979 - 1990, Israel's total
exports increased by 157 percent- -from $4,553 billion in 1979
to $11,704 billion in 1990, as shown in Table XV.
Although Israel's total exports increased 1.6 times, its
imports were not enough to reduce Israel's trade deficit,
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Table XIV. ISRAELI IMPORTS FROM MAJOR COUNTRIES 1979 - 1990
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1990
TOTAL 8332 10191 9591 10136 14360 14389 16508
U.S. 1512 1630.3 1723 1705.6 1935 2358 2723
GERMANY 768 840.9 1040 900.5 1537 1428 1794
U.K. 688 603.8 667 755.1 1117 1157 1317
BELGIUM-
LUX. 288 319.8 583 992.9 1686 2010 2029
JAPAN 170 127.7 274 186.2 401 356 546
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
International Monetary Fund, 1980, 1988,
1991.
which increased by 27 percent, from $3,779 billion in 1979 to
$4,804 billion in 1990.
From this analysis it can be concluded that Israel's trade
relations increased steadily. More conclusions on this
subject are provided after analysis and comparison to Arab
world trade.
1. Israeli Trade with the U.S., 1979 - 1990
From Tables XIV and XV, it can be seen that the U.S.
remained as the most important trade market for Israeli
exports and imports. Israel's imports from the U.S. increased
by 80 percent during the years 1979 - 1990. In 1979, Israel's
imports from the U.S. were $1,512 billion, and by 1990,
imports rose to $2,723 billion. In 1985, imports declined one
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Table XV. ISRAELI EXPORTS TO MAJOR COUNTRIES 1979 - 1990
(in millions of U.S. dollars!
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1988 1990
TOTAL 4553 5670 5108 6260 8454 10737 11704
U.S. 749 1222 1329 2134 2562 3313 3458
GERMANY 419 401 356 334 412 526 701
U.K. 394 462 411 477 598 749 838
BELGIUM -
LUX. 1 219 204 251 242 267 549 680
JAPAN 223 206 189 210 484 758 871
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
International Monetary Fund, 1980, 1988,
1991.
Note 1: Israel trade data with Belgium and Luxembourg
are combined in the Direction of Trade
Statistics Yearbook.
percent for one year. Israel's exports to the U.S. increased
by 362 percent- -from $749 million in 1979 to $3,458 billion in
1990.
It can be seen that an interesting change was made in this
decade, when Israel for the first time had a trade surplus
with the U.S. In 1990, Israel had a trade surplus of $735
million, compared to a $763 million trade deficit in 1979. It
can be suggested that the reason was the Free Trade Region
agreement signed in 1985, and tougher regulations against the
boycott in the U.S.
In general, The Arab boycott did not succeed very well in
influencing U.S. trade with Israel in this era.
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2. Israeli Trade with West Germany, 1979 - 199
Tables XIV and XV indicate that West Germany was the
second largest country for Israeli trade. Israel's imports
from West Germany increased by 133 percent- -from $768 million
in 1979 to $1,794 billion in 1990. In 1989, Israel's imports
declined by seven percent for one year. Israel's exports to
West Germany increased by 67 percent- -from $419 million in
1979 to $701 million in 1990. During the years 1981 to 1985,
Israel's exports to West Germany declined 20 percent.
In 1990, Israel's trade deficit with West Germany was
$1,093 billion compared to a trade deficit of $349 million in
1979. Israel's main branch of exports to Germany was
textiles, in the amount of $112 million, out of $701 million
in total exports. [Ref. 85]
From our Israel and West Germany analysis, it can be
seen that the Arab boycott of Israel did not succeed in
preventing Israeli trade with West Germany and trade between
Israel and West Germany improved rapidly.
3. Israeli Trade with the U.K., 1979 - 1990
From Table XIV it can be seen that Israel's imports
from the United Kingdom increased by 9 percent- -from $688
million in 1979 to $1,317 billion in 1990. In 1981, Israel's
imports declined for one year by 12 percent. Israel's exports
to the U.K. increased by 112 percent- - from $394 million in
1979 to $838 million in 1990. The main branch of exports to
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the U.K. was textiles, accounting for $171 million. Israel's
trade deficit with the U.K. increased from $294 million in
1979 to $479 million in 1990. [Ref. 86]
During the years 1979 - 1990, Israeli and U.K. trade
relations improved in spite of the Arab boycott.
4. Israeli Trade with Belgium and Luxembourg, 1979 - 1990
In this decade, Belgium and Luxembourg rose to be the
second biggest exporters to Israel. The main branch of
imports was unworked diamonds in the amount of $1,422 billion
for 1987, from total imports in that year of $14,360 billion.
[Ref. 87]
From Table XIV it can be seen that Israel's total
imports from Belgium and Luxembourg increased by 645 percent-
-
from $282 million in 1979 to $2,029 billion in 1990.
Table XV indicates that Israel's exports to Belgium
and Luxembourg increased by 210 percent- -from $219 million in
1979 to $680 million in 1979.
Although Israel's exports to Belgium and Luxembourg
doubled in this decade, the Israeli trade deficit was
significantly increased from $63 million in 1979 to $1,349
billion in 1990, about 30 percent of Israel's total deficit.
Israel's trade with Belgium and Luxembourg showed a
big improvement in this decade. It is clearly evident that in
Belgium and Luxembourg, the Arab boycott did not make any
improvement during this decade.
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5. Israeli Trade with Japan, 1979 - 199
The data in Table XIV indicate that Israel's imports
from Japan increased by 221 percent during the years 19 79
(with $170 million) until 1990 (with $546 million) . Israel's
exports to Japan increased by 29 percent during the years
1979 (with $223 million) until 1990 (with $871 million) . The
main make-up of Israel's exports to Japan in 19 87 was
diamonds, precious stones and precious metals, for a total
amount of $389.8 million, about 80.5 percent of Israel's total
exports to Japan. [Ref. 88]
Israel is one of a few countries in the world that has
a trade surplus with Japan. In 1979, Israel had a trade
surplus of $53 million, which grew to $325 million in 1990.
As described in the political analysis, it is suggested that
the major reason for that surplus was the Arab boycott.- But,
with the political change in Japanese policy towards Israel as
Japan became less dependent on Arab oil (as will be presented
in the political analysis) , we can understand such a change in
the trade relations between these two countries.
To summarize, three main factors influenced Israeli
trade:
1. In comparison to previous periods, Israel's- trade with
Western countries and Japan was booming.
2. A significant increase in Israeli exports to the U.S. was
accomplished.
3. Another significant change was the increase of unworked
diamonds imported to Israel from Belgium and Luxembourg.
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It can be concluded from these three main changes in
Israeli trade that the Arab boycott of Israel lost most of its
power in this era, or at least that the boycott could not
eliminate a broad improvement in Israel's trade relations
compared to previous periods. This conclusion will be shown
more strongly below.
Table XVI. ISRAELI TRADE WITH EGYPT 1979 - 1990
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1990
IMPORTS .1 2.3 .7 3.8 4.7 5.0
EXPORTS 15.7 7.1 7.5 2.3 4.5 6.3
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
International Monetary Bank, 1979, 19 88,
1991.
6. Israeli Trade with Egypt, 1979 - 1990
The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was
signed in 1979. But Table XVI indicates that little trade
occurred between the two countries following the agreement.
The total amount of trade increased up to $5 million in
imports from Egypt into Israel, and $6.3 million in exports
from Israel to Egypt in 1990. The biggest amount of trade
that Israel exported to Egypt was $15.7 million in 1981, ten
years ago.
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It may be concluded that although Israel and Egypt
signed a peace agreement in 1979, which included easing the
Arab boycott on Israeli - Egyptian trade relations, the two
countries did not develop extensive trade agreements. There
are several possible explanations for this. First, Egypt
opposed Israel's involvement in the Lebanese War in 19 82.
This explains why Israeli exports increased until 1981 only.
Second, there was internal pressure from Egyptian public
opinion and external pressure from Arab countries against the
peace agreement with Israel. And third, the Egyptian
government was dissatisfied with Israel's way of dealing with
the Palestinian issues.
Indirect conclusions can be drawn from these data.
Israel did not use the opportunity provided by the trade
agreement to buy crude oil from Egypt. Israel preferred to
buy oil from other long distance Western countries for two
reasons. First, the prices that Egypt asked for oil were much
higher than other long distance countries, even though the
price of carrying the oil from Egypt to Israel should be lower
than the long distance carrying prices. Second, there is no
scarcity of oil in the market, hence Israel can achieve all of
its needs from the free market. For these two reasons, and
from the political analysis and the economic analysis, it can
be understood why the declining power of oil decreased the
power of the Arab boycott of Israel.
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7 . Main Arab Nation Trade with Japan
Japan was and still is a very unique country with
regard to the Arab boycott of Israel, as was explained in
chapter III. In order to compare Japanese and Israeli trade
direction with Arab countries' trade with Japan, and to
determine whether Japan is less dependent upon Arab oil in
this era, I chose to examine Japan's trade with select Arab
countries. The data which are provided in Table XVII are as
close as possible to the years of Tables XIV and XV.
Table XVII. TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND SELECT ARAB COUNTRIES 1981
- 1990
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1981 1985 1990 1981 1985 1990
SAUDI
ARABIA 21,424 10,300 10495 5,857 3,922 3,350
UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES 8,811 8,930 9,083 1,489 1,173 1,553
IRAQ 927 626 893 3,022 1,318 271
EGYPT 206 551 121 792 738 526
SYRIA 11 3 5 253 128 70
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
International Monetary Fund, 1988, 1991.
It can be seen from Table XVII that the years 19 81 to
199 were a turning point in trade relationships between Japan
and the Arab world.
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Saudi Arabia's exports to Japan declined 51 percent-
-
from $21,424 billion in 1980 to $10,300 billion in 1985. In
this decade, Japan's exports to Saudi Arabia decreased by 43
percent (from 1981 to 1990)
.
Iraq, Egypt and Syria all showed extreme declines both
in imports from and exports to Japan during the years 19 81 -
1990. The United Arab Emirates is the only country that
succeeded in maintaining about the same trade with Japan,
actually experiencing a small increase of about three to four
percent both in imports and exports.
It may be concluded that Japanese trade with the big
Arab world traders decreased significantly during the years
1979 - 1990.
8. The Main Arab Countries Trade with the U.S.
The U.S. was the big trading country both with the
Arab world and with Israel, until 1979. The economic analysis
of Israel's trade with the U.S. also showed an increase of
trade and particularly the new situation of an Israeli trade
surplus with the U.S. In order to examine U.S. trade with
Arab countries and to compare it to U.S. trade with Israel, I
chose to examine U.S. trade with select Arab countries. The
data in Table XVIII are as close as possible to the data in
Tables XIV and XV.
The decade between the years 1980 and 1990 was not as
good a trade decade as the previous decade for the Arab
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Table XVIII. TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SELECT ARAB COUNTRIES
1981 - 1990
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1981 1985 1990 1981 1985 1990
SAUDI
ARABIA 15237 2027 10733 7327 4474 4035
UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES 2102 722 952 1077 597 998
IRAQ 167 491 3247 914 427 640
EGYPT 412 84 435 2159 2323 2249
SYRIA 88 3 57 143 107 151
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
International Monetary Fund, 1988, 1991.
countries. During the 1980' s, trade with the U.S. either
remained steady or declined. Table XVIII indicates that in
1990, Saudi Arabia exported to the U.S. 30 percent less
compared to 19 81. In 199 Saudi Arabia exported to the U.S.
in the amount of $10,733 billion compared to 1981 with the
amount of $15,237 billion and the year 1985 with $2,027
billion! At the same time U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia
decreased by 45 percent.
From Table XVIII it can be seen that U.S. imports from
the United Arab Emirates decreased by 55 percent- -from $2,021
billion in 1981 to $952 million in 1990. During the same
time, 1981 to 1990, U.S. exports to the United Arab Emirates
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decreased by seven percent- -from $1,077 billion in 1981 to
$952 million in 1990.
The data in Table XVIII indicate that U.S. imports
from Egypt increased by five percent- -from $412 million in
1981 to $435 million in 1990. U.S. exports to Egypt increased
by four percent- -from $2,159 billion in 1981 to $2,249 billion
in 1990.
An interesting trade increase the U.S. developed with
Iraq before the Gulf War is shown. Table XVIII indicates that
U.S. imports from Iraq increased by 1,844 percent from 1981
(with $167 million) to 1990 (with $3,247 billion). U.S.
exports to Iraq decreased by 29 percent- -from $914 million to
$640 million.
From Table XVIII it can be seen that U.S. imports from
Syria decreased from $88 million in 1981 to $5T million in
1990 (a 35 percent decrease) . U.S. exports to Syria increased
from $143 million in 1981 to $151 million in 1990 (about a six
percent increase) .
It may be concluded that U.S. trade with most of the
Arab countries decreased significantly in this period. By
connecting this conclusion to an economic analysis of Israeli
trade during the same period of time, we can conclude that the
Arab boycott lost a lot of its power. For example, during the
same period, Israeli exports increased by 362 percent, and
Israeli imports from the U.S. increased by 80 percent. It
appears that the U.S. ant i -boycott regulations were a turning
79
point in U.S. policy towards the Arab boycott, as will be
described below.
9 . Israel - The Loss of the Iranian Market
In 1978 Israel and Iran had a full diplomatic
relationship. Israel exported to Iran in the amount of $9 6.8
million and imported from Iran in the amount of $7.8 million.
After Khomeni came to power, Israel lost an important export
market and trade declined to zero.[Ref. 89] The new
government in Iran adopted the Arab boycott regulations
against Israel.
C. POLITICAL ANALYSIS
1. Israel's Response to the Boycott
The Israel Economic Warfare Authority presented a
document to the participants in the 1984 Brussels Seminar on
"Freedom of Trade with Israel" which included the following
description of how individual boycott cases are dealt with by
the Authority. Such cases, the document stated, are referred
to the Authority by Israeli and foreign companies, Israeli
representatives abroad, or voluntary organizations in Israel
and abroad, or are brought to its attention by press reports.
[Ref. 90]
"The handling of these cases usually starts with an
investigation as to whether they are indeed boycott
related, or whether abstention from doing business with
Israel is based on commercial reasons only. If the




After that any of the following steps may be taken: The
Economic Warfare Authority can initiate an approach to the
foreign company involved in the boycott. Also, an Israeli
representative, or a member of a local bi -national Chamber of
Commerce, or a client or supplier of the company, can ask the
foreign company to withdraw from surrender to the boycott.
Sometimes the Authority might ask for participation of public
opinion through the media. [Ref. 91]
Some of the non- Israeli participants in the Brussels
Seminar in 19 84 complained about the apparent lack of interest
in the subject in the Israeli Government. One of the specific
complaints was that whereas Israel was pushing foreign
countries to pass anti-boycott legislation, none was passed in
Israel. [Ref. 92]
However, the Economic Warfare Authority seldom
succeeded in its work in dealing with cases brought to its
attention. [Ref. 93] The reasons why Israeli
companies which suffered from the boycott did not approach the
Authority are: First, the larger companies, and conglomerates
especially, had their own ways of dealing with the boycott.
Second, many companies were averse to working too closely with
the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible to the
Authority. Third, many companies simply did not know of the
existence of the Economic Warfare Authority.
[Ref. 94]
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Two major events caused increasing 'Voluntary
Boycott' 2 of Israel by foreign companies and caused foreign
governments not to take a full pro- Israeli position in the
boycott issue. The first of these was Israel's involvement in
the Lebanese War during the years 1982 - 1985. The second was
the 'Intifada,' the Palestinian civil war against Israel.
Both events brought strong public opinion against Israel all
over the world, beginning in 1987.
For example, President Francois Mitterand of France,
fulfilled his preelection promise of reactivating the 1977
ant i -boycott legislation and removing all obstacles from its
application. This was done within the framework of the Mauroy
circular of July 17, 1981. However, as a result of Israeli
involvement in the Lebanese War, which began in June 1982, the
implementation of the new policy was put off until 1984.
[Ref. 95]
In an article, "Israel's Best-Kept Secret," Hesh
Kestin from Forbes magazine dated October 22, 1984, noted that
"despite the Arab boycott, Israeli businessmen do a
thriving business -perhaps $500 million worth of goods
annually-with their sworn enemies... This recent trade is
apart from Israel's thriving international arms sales,
some of which find their way to Moslem countries. Israeli
manufacturers, working with Arabs in Israeli -administered
territories and with sympathetic European and American
traders abroad, have found ways to penetrate even the most
2 This boycott resulted from a logical extension of the
implications of the secondary and tertiary boycotts. In such
cases, companies simply declined to deal with Israel or companies
related to Israel for fear of antagonizing present or prospective
Arab clients.
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hostile countries in the Arab market, selling everything
..." [Ref. 96]
Kestin also described an incident in which
"
... An Arab League official who enforces the 35 -year-old
Arab boycott against Israel got a nasty shock recently.
He opened a box of chocolates in Kuwait and found they




It can be concluded that Arab countries, after 35
years of boycotting Israel, became weak in enforcing the Arab
boycott of Israel even in their own countries.
2. Israeli and Egyptian Trade
Israeli businessmen had hoped that the peace agreement
with Egypt would bring healthy trade, but they were
disappointed. Israel's trade with Egypt has been
insignificant - about two million dollars or so annually. In
view of the high hopes, peace with Egypt, all in all, has been
a trade bust. Hesh Kestin, a Forbes reporter, wrote that "The
Egyptians themselves don't want to be blacklisted. They are
doing business with the Arabs. "[Ref. 98]
In a non- democratic country such as Egypt, the Arab
boycott is not the main issue. In Egypt, the majority of the
trade decisions are made by the government. So in this case,
other things influence the Israeli - Egyptian trade, like
Israeli involvement in the Lebanese War in 1982, and Israel's
policy on the Palestinian issues in the West Bank and Gaza.
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3 . Japan and the Arab Boycott Policy-
Japan has always been most supportive of the Arab
boycott. Most of the large Japanese companies publicly refuse
to do any direct or indirect trade with Israel. The Japanese
Government has refused to do anything to change the companies'
policy. [Ref. 99]
In "Japan Israel's Problem," dated March 9, 1987,
Howard Stanislawski of The New Republic, described the Israeli
- Japanese relationship as follows:
"... There is a long way in which Japan has been unwilling
to deal with Israel. Japan Air Lines has refused to
establish mutual landing rights with the Israeli airline,
El Al . Although Israeli ships call on Japanese ports, no
Japanese ships drop anchor in Israel . No Japanese
governmental minister, political or economic, has ever
visited Israel. No Japanese economic delegation has ever
visited Israel. Even proposed cultural exchanges,
including those initiated by officials of the Japanese
Embassy in Israel, have reportedly been met with foot-
dragging and opposition at the Japanese end, often
effectively scuttling the proposals. The Japanese
government has stated many times that it will not advise
Japanese companies whether or not to comply with the
boycott." [Ref. 100]
In June 19 88, a turning point can be seen when a
Japanese Foreign Minister, Souke Uno, visited Israel, the
first to do so. After various projects for economic
cooperation were presented to him, the Japanese response was
that such cooperation could take place once progress was made
in the peace process. Nevertheless, Israeli officials
expressed the hope that the mere occurrence of the visit would
serve as an indication to the Japanese business community that
contacts with Israel were no longer taboo. [Ref. 101]
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In order to sell Honda automobiles in Israel and not
be hurt by both the new U.S. regulations (Export
Administration Act, see below) and by the CBO, U.S. Honda
spokesman Robert Butorac announced in August 7, 1989, that
"American Honda would start selling cars manufactured at its
Marysville, Ohio, plant in Israel next year."
[Ref. 102]
From the Los Angeles Times published on October 10,
1990, we learn that Israel's relations with Japan have
improved
:
".. Japanese - Israeli relations have gradually improved
in recent years. The two countries agreed to explore
possible economic and technological collaboration late
last year after then - Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe
Arens made a short five-day visit to Japan. .
"
[Ref. 103]
In the beginning of 1991, Toyota, the world's No. 2
auto maker, announced that it would begin selling 5,000
Corollas a year in Israel beginning in 1992. Nissan has
indicated it is ready to make a similar move, and Mazda
appears to be not far behind. [Ref. 104]
Israel's well known journalist, Yehuda Litani, said in
response to this issue:
"Toyota is the beginning of a new era. If Toyota is not
afraid, no one is afraid. If Toyota is here, the boycott
does not exist". [Ref. 105]
After reading both the political and economic analysis
of Japan's dealing with the boycott, it is quite evident that
Japan's position toward the boycott has changed during this
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decade. Japan has begun to trade with Israel in spite of the
boycott regulations. This is further evidence that the power
of the boycott decreased significantly in this decade.
D. U.S RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT, 1979 - 1990
The U.S. Department of Commerce enforced the anti -boycott
policy which resulted from the Export Administration
Amendments (EAA) . These were revised by Congress into the
Export Administration Act of 1979 and signed by President
Carter on September 29, 1979. The department's office of
Anti-Boycott Compliance imposed fines against U.S. firms and
their foreign subsidiaries that complied with boycott demands
and levied increasing fines against companies that failed to
report receipt of boycott requests. For example, Citibank of
New York was penalized with the largest fine in 1983
$323,000. [Ref. 106]
In fiscal year 1983, only 3.8 percent of reporting U.S.
companies obeyed prohibited boycott requests. These
companies' total fines were $1.4 million. Over 2,100
noncomplying companies refused to surrender to boycott
conditions in transactions worth $8.1 billion.
[Ref. 107]
The 1979 Export Administration Act contained, in addition
to maximum civil penalties of $10,000 per infraction, criminal
penalties calling for fines of up to $50,000 or five times the
value of the exports involved, whichever was greater, or
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imprisonment for up to five years, or both. Furthermore,
revocation of the authority to export goods generally could be
imposed as an administrative sanction. [Ref . 108]
The Briggs and Stratton Corporation of Wauwatosa,
Wisconsin, a manufacturer of internal combustion engines,
claimed in its 1980 suit against the U.S. Government, that its
annual sales of equipment to Arab countries would be lost if
it was prevented from responding to a boycott questionnaire.
The questionnaire inquired whether Briggs and Stratton
Corporation had any business with a number of American
companies and whether it had engaged in business activity with
Israel or with Israeli firms. The court rejected this suit.
[Ref. 109]
In the largest penalty of its kind, Safeway Stores Inc.
announced March 14, 19 88, that it had agreed to pay the
Commerce Department $995,000 to settle the Department's
charges that the company had illegally complied with the Arab
boycott against Israel. Paul Freedenberg, Undersecretatry of
Commerce for Export Administration, said:
"I am pleased with the settlement... It is equitable, and
it indicates we take enforcement of the anti -boycott laws
very seriously and will continue to vigorously enforce
them". [Ref. 110]
It may be concluded that enforcement of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 has had a very effective




Table XIX. BOYCOTT REQUESTS REPORTED BY U.S. FIRMS 19 65 - 19 83
Peri od No. of Requests
Oct. 1965 - June 1969 24,500
Oct. 1970 - June 1975 21,000
Oct. 1975 - Sept. 1976 169,710
Oct. 1976 - Sept. 1977 153,815
Oct. 1977 - Sept. 1978 67,942
Oct. 1978 - Sept
.
1979 39,293
Oct. 1979 - Sept 1980 37,737
Oct. 1980 - Sept. 1981 50,204
Oct. 1981 - Sept 1982 57,456
Oct. 1982 - Sept. 1983 37,500
* Note: Reporting requirements in late 1975 were
broadened to include freight forwarders,
banks, shipping companies, and service
organizations. Previously, only exporters of
goods were obligated to file reports.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Export
Administration Reports, 1977 - 1983,
Washington D.C., and Aaron Sarna, Boycott and
Blacklist, 1986.
From Table XIX it can be seen that the number of boycott
requests received by U.S. companies decreased from 1976 to
1983. In fiscal year 1976, 169,710 requests were reported,
compared to a low of 37,500 requests in the 1982 fiscal year.
It can be concluded that the Export Administration Act of
1979 forced the Arab countries to decrease the number of
questionnaires in order not to damage and to ruin their trade
relations with the U.S.
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The Tax Reform Act, which was legislated in 1976, has also
been successful in preventing American companies from
participating in the Arab boycott. From 3000 companies which
reported on business with boycotting countries in 1982, 160
disclosed that they had agreed to participate in the boycott.
These companies lost tax benefits totaling $10 million.
[Ref. Ill]
The U.S. Office of Anti-Boycott Compliance announced in
19 85 that Lockheed Engineering and Management Services of
Houston and its consultant had agreed to pay separate civil
penalties of $10,000 each and incur the loss of their export
privileges for one year with respect to Saudi Arabia, on the
grounds that they had refused to consider a Jewish applicant
for employment in that country
.
[Ref . 112]
It is evident that the tough U.S. regulations against the
Arab boycott had a major impact on reducing the Arab boycott
of Israel in this decade.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The time period 1979 - 1990 witnessed a decrease in the
power of the Arab boycott of Israel. From the analysis of
this chapter, it can be concluded that two major factors
account for this reduction in the power of the Arab boycott.
First, the legislation of the Export Administration Act by
the Congress of the U.S. had a significant impact. This Act
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decreased significantly the numbers of questionnaires required
by Arab countries.
Second, in spite of the change of regime in Iran and the
temporary escalation of oil prices in 1979, the finding of oil
in the North Sea brought a decrease in oil prices and seemed
to solve the problem of blackmailing by oil crisis, as was the
situation until 1979. The diminishing power of oil created a
significant drop in both Japanese and U.S. trade with the Arab
countries.
In spite of the Arab boycott, the Free Trade Region
agreement between Israel and the U.S. (1985) increased Israeli
exports to the U.S. significantly and was the major reason for
Israel's surplus trade with the U.S.
The high expectations of trade arising from the Israeli -
Egyptian peace agreement were not realized. This was because
of the Lebanese War (1982) , Israel's dealings with Palestinian
issues and heavy pressure on Egypt from other Arab countries.
The Israeli government's attitude to the Arab boycott has
never radically changed. In Brussels, for example, the
Israeli government was blamed by Jewish organizations for
ignoring the Arab boycott during this era.
It can be concluded from the Japanese response to the Arab
boycott of Israel, as well as the impact of U.S. legislation
against the Arab boycott and the decrease of oil power in the
world, that the Arab boycott lost a lot of its power during
this era. Thus the Arab boycott by itself was very weak.
90
Recall that as a result of the oil crisis and the increase in
oil prices, the Arab boycott began to be a danger and threat
to Israel's economy during the years 1973 - 1979.
In summary, the Arab boycott of Israel became a turning
point in this decade. From the difference between the period
1973 and 1979, and 1979 and 1990, it appears that the Arab
boycott was much stronger when supported by the economic
weapon of the oil embargo to convince and threaten firms and
countries to comply with the boycott. Without such an oil
weapon, as was present after 1979, and with the tough actions
of Western countries such as the U.S. against the Arab
boycott, the Arab boycott would have lost its teeth.
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VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Evidence has been presented that the Arab boycott of
Israel reflects two kinds of failure. On the one hand, the
Arab countries, with their oil power, failed to affect totally
Israel's economic growth, as was declared in the beginning of
the boycott as its objective. On the other hand, Israel
failed to take more effective steps against the Arab boycott,
both by itself and by convincing the free world nations to act
against the Arab boycott more strongly.
This research has presented and proved economically and
politically, that the Arab boycott of Israel had three
distinct phases.
(1) The first of these was the period from the declaration
of the Arab boycott in 1946 until the 1973 War. In this era,
the Arab boycott achieved its main aim to prevent any direct
trade between Israel and Arab countries. The other boycotts
(Secondary and Tertiary boycott) had less success in achieving
their target, which was to prevent any trade between Israel
and the rest of the world. Japan, however, almost totally
froze its exports to Israel.
Although Israel suffered from the Arab boycott in this
period, people in Israel looked at the boycott as merely a
nuisance. No substantive or sustained Israeli actions were
taken against the Arab boycott.
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During this period, it appears that the U.S. did not have
a significant interest in preventing the boycott in the U.S.
As a result, no federal law was passed to prohibit
participation in boycotting Israel.
(2) The second phase of the boycott took place between the
1973 War and the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and
Egypt. In this phase the Arab boycott changed its appearance
and achieved international effectiveness largely as a result
of the power of oil. The Arab oil weapon of 19 73 can be seen
as a turning point for the Arab boycott. As a result of both
the 19 73 War and particularly the Arab oil weapon, Israel and
most of the Western countries realized that the Arab boycott
was not only a problem but a danger and a threat as well.
As a result of the Arab boycott and the oil weapon, and
although Israeli total imports and exports rose by more than
100 percent in this era, economic data indicate that Israel
did suffer from the Arab boycott. A comparison of Israel's
trade with Arab countries' trade, specifically non oil
exporting countries such as Egypt and Syria, shows that
Israel's trade growth was much lower than the Arab countries'
trade growth.
Israel recognized that the Arab boycott was a real threat
in this era. As a result, Israel, for the first time in the
29 years of the Arab boycott's existence, established the
Anti -Boycott Authority. This Authority initiated actions
against the boycott from Israel and abroad by convincing
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Western countries to resist the Arab boycott, as described in
Chapter IV and V.
The main factor affecting the U.S. response to the Arab
boycott in this period was the oil crisis and its byproducts
of high inflation, large deficits, and high unemployment
(stagflation) . As a result, the boycott came to be viewed as
an American domestic problem as well. The U.S. reaction to
the Arab boycott is evident in two major pieces of
legislation: the amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and
the 1977 amendments to the Export Administration Act.
(3) The third phase of the Arab boycott began with the
1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt and ends in
1990. In this period, the power of the Arab boycott declined.
Two factors account of this change: the diminishing power of
oil, and the tough U.S. legislation against the Arab boycott.
These developments also improved Israeli trade relations with
the rest of the Western world, not only with the U.S.
The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1979
brought frustration to those who expected that Israel's trade
with such a close and big country as Egypt would open a huge
trade market. The relatively low level of trade between
Israel and Egypt can be explained by Egyptian dissatisfaction
with Israel because of the Lebanese war in 1982, and Israel's
policies toward Palestinian issues (Intifada) . Heavy
political pressure from other Arab countries also influenced
Egypt in its trade relations with Israel.
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In assessing the points presented by this study and from
comparing these three eras of change in the direction and
impact of the Arab boycott, it can be concluded that the Arab
boycott was strongest when it had the economic weapon of the
oil embargo to convince and threaten firms and countries to
comply with the boycott. Without such leverage (in the period
since 1979 and before 1973) and with tough actions of Western
countries such as the U.S. opposing the Arab boycott, it can
be said that the Arab boycott lost its teeth.
As in every conflict in the Middle East, the U.S. role was
significant. When the U.S. decided to take serious actions
against the Arab boycott of Israel beginning in 1975, the
power of the Arab boycott declined dramatically. Without the
power of oil, the Arab countries preferred not to attack the
U.S. directly, in spite of its tough regulations against the
Arab boycott
.
In sum, the Arab boycott did not succeed in destroying
Israel economically as was its declared intention when it was
established in 1946.
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APPENDIX A. THE BOYCOTT AFFIDAVIT
A. THE AFFIDAVIT
A firm doing business in the Arab world for the first time
must have a corporate officer sign a notarized affidavit that
it does not, and will not, violate boycott regulations. A
sample follows:
We hereby, certify under our own responsibility,
that our firm, namely, , has no
commercial, industrial, and/or any other relations
with Israel; our firm does not constitute a
branch, subsidiary, or main office of any other
Israeli firm. We further declare that we have no
direct of indirect interests in all or any
Israeli concerns, whether governmental of
nongovernmental. [Ref. 113]
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APPENDIX B. THE ARAB BOYCOTT CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN
A. THE CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN
Firms shipping goods to Arab countries must provide a
negative certificate of origin. The following is a sample
from the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce:
I hereby certify that I have investigated the
foregoing statements and to the best of knowledge
and belief the articles described above are the
growth, product, or manufacture of the United
States of America; furthermore that these articles
are not of Israeli origin, and that no Israeli
products were used in their
manufacture. [Ref . 114]
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APPENDIX C. THE ARAB BOYCOTT QUESTIONNAIRE
A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Firms suspected of dealing with Israel receive a
questionnaire from the Central Boycott Office (CBO) in
Damascus demanding private information and assurance that
trade with Israel will be discontinued. A sample
Questionnaire follows:
Gentlemen:
We wish to inform you that we have acquired reliable
information to the effect that you are the agents of the
Company of Israel.
In this regard, we believe that it is of mutual interest
to both of us to draw your attention to the fact that the Arab
countries are still in a state of war with Israel. Therefore,
as a measure of self-defense and with a view to safeguarding
the rights and vital interests of the Arabs of Palestine, the
Arab countries strictly adhere to a set of boycott rules
directed at Israel.... Violation of these regulations entails
the boycott of violators in the Arab countries.
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However, before any action is taken against your firm, we
find it beneficial for you, as well as for us, to contact you
directly so that you may inform us of the nature of the
dealings of your firm with Israel. This will have to be done
in the form of a declaration duly signed before the competent
governmental authorities and should also bear a final
authentication to the signature of the authorized
representative of your firm appended thereto by the closest
consulate or diplomatic mission of any Arab country. The
required declaration will have to contain complete answers to
the following questions:
1) Do you have any branch, office, or agency in Israel?
In case you have, please state the nature of its activity.
2) Do you act as general agents of Israeli companies?
Particularly, the company of Israel.
3) Have you ever owned shares in Israeli firms or
businesses?
4) Is your firm or any of its directors a member of any
foreign- Israeli chamber of commerce in Israel or abroad?
If your answer is in the positive, you will then be kindly
requested to present the following:
a) An official copy of your agency agreement with the said
company [other Israeli company]
,
provided that it be duly
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certified by your chamber of commerce in writing and
authenticated by your competent governmental authorities and
by any Arab consulate in your area of activity.
b) Documentation to the effect that you have terminated
the agency agreement and showing the consent of the Israeli
side to such termination. Such documents will have to be duly
certified as shown in the above paragraph.
c) An undertaking to the effect that you will never
represent Israeli companies in the future.
We look forward to receiving your reply in the above-
mentioned form within a maximum period not to exceed three
months from the date of this letter.
Finally, we do hope that you will extend sympathetic
understanding of the compelling considerations which render
this measures mandatory. It is our sincere hope that you will









APPENDIX D. DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING BOYCOTT COMPLIANCE
KAWASAKI DOCKYARD CO., LTD.
14 Higashi- Kawasaki -Cho
2 - Chome
Ikuta-Ku, Kobe, Japan
Our File No. KMB-67-10291
Kobe, July 6, 1967
Mr. E. Epstein
Representative
Zim Israel Navigation Co., Ltd.
C/o Sannomiya Bldg.,
KOBE
Re: Abt. 100.000 DWT Oil Tanker
Dear Sir:
With regard to the subject matter, it is our real regret
to inform you by this letter that we have to decline this new
building deal on the ground of the following aspects for all
of our various negotiations with you until this very day.
Namely, one of the Kawasaki Group company has a business
transaction with the U.A.R. which fact was not made known to
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us at the time of our early negotiation with you for this
deal. However, this fact has been recently put before us at
a consultation meeting of the Kawasaki Group and at that
meeting, the said company has strongly made his appeal to us
that we discontinue this particular business for Israel.
Under the above circumstances, we, all of a sudden are
compelled to put forward this declination to you with a
thousand pities and this matter will trouble our conscience
for your very kind assistance made in negotiation of this deal
to date. Please understand our position and accept our deep
apology for this unhappy situation.
Taking this opportunity, we wish to add that this action
has no bearing with the Japanese government and we have never
received their instruction nor suggestion and the decisions
made by us is purely based on our discretion.
We trust that this declination will not have any
unfavorable influence on our amicable relations with your
esteemed company.
Your very truly,






SHIBA ELECTRIC CO., LTD.





Tokyo, 15th May 1967
Dear Sirs:
Subject: Closed Circuit Television
Thanks for your kind letter dated 7 May 1967 for the subject.
In this regard, to our regret, we wish to refrain from quoting
the article, because our company has closely dealt with Arabic
countries
.
Please understand our position as above.
Yours faithfully,
Shiba Electric Co., Ltd.
M. Takekawa




APPENDIX E. UNIFIED LAW ON THE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL
1. All persons within the enacting country are forbidden to
conclude any agreement or transaction, directly or indirectly
with any person or organization (i) situated in Israel; (ii)
affiliated with Israel through nationality; or (iii) working
for or on behalf of Israel., regardless of place of business
or residence.
2. Importation into the enacting country is forbidden of all
Israeli goods, including goods manufactured elsewhere
containing ingredients or components of Israeli origin or
manufacture
.
3. Foreign companies with offices, branches or general
agencies in Israel shall be considered prohibited corporations
for purposes of the prohibition on agreements or transactions.
4. All goods destined for Israel, directly or indirectly, or
for persons prohibited by the preceding paragraphs, are
considered Israeli goods and therefore subject to the ban on
exports as well as transit.
5. In addition to these provisions in the Unified Law, the
Central Boycott Office maintains a number of blacklists- -for
instance of firms that permit their trademarks or patents to
be used in Israel; of banks that have engaged in financing
major projects in Israel, selling Israel bonds elsewhere; and
of ships, (not generally shipping companies) that call at an
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